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INTRODUCTION
Many scholars have theorized that cases that go to trial are not
representative of the larger pooi of disputes.’ If tried cases are sub
stantively different from the much larger set of cases that settle prior
to trial,2 then published case law provides on1 a distorted window
into peoples’ behavior in response to legal rules, unless we determine
the mechanisms by which cases are "selected" for trial.
Although most scholars agree that litigated cases are an unrepre
sentative sample of legal disputes, they disagree on what causes tri
als,4 and little empirical evidence exists about what factors impact on
l
One of the most well-known theories that cases nonrandomly go to trial or settle is de
veloped in Priest and Klein’s landmark article. See George L. Priest & Benjamin Klein, The
Selection of Disputes for Litigation, 13 J. LEGAL STUD. 1, 3 1984 demonstrating that, under
certain assumptions, cases closest to the applicable "decision standard" are disproportionately
selected for trial; see also Theodore Eisenberg, Litigation Models and Trial Outcomes in Civil
Rights and Prisoner Cases, 77 Gao. U. 1567, 1568 1989 stating that "expectations theory"
suggests that cases that go to trial might not reflect the characteristics of the pool of all dis
putes. Other theories also predict that cases are not randomly tried or settled, although the
theories disagree about which cases are more likely to be selected for trial. See infra notes 2335 and accompanying text.
2
Most cases settle. See, e.g., Janet Cooper Alexander, Do the Merits Matter? A Study of
Settlements in Securities Class Actions, 43 STAN. L. REV. 497, 498 1991 stating that five
percent or less of litigated cases are tried to judgment citing Annual Report of the Director,
Administrative Office of United States Courts, in 1987 REPORTS OF THE PROCEEDINGS OF THE
JUDIcIAL CONFERENCE OF THE UNITED STATES 211 tbl. C4A; Judith Resnik, Managerial
Judges, 96 HARV. U. REv. 374, 405 1982 "Eighty-five to ninety percent of all federal civil
suits end by settlement." footnote omitted; David M. Trubek eL al., The Costs of Ordinary
litigation, 31 UCLA L. Ray. 72, 89 1983 stating that approximately 8% of civil suits filed in
state or federal court went to trial.
Settlement figures are similar for tax cases. See. e.g., James A. McQueen, Tax Litigation
and Attorney’s Fees: Still a Win-Lose Dichotomy, 57 S. CAL. L. REv. 471, 473 1984
"[Ninety-seven percent of all tax disputes with the IRS are resolved without recourse to
trial.". Internal Revenue Service IRS data reflects that from 1990 through 1994, approxi
mately 74.0% to 80.1% of regular cases filed in Tax Court settled and only 5.0% to 5.5% of the
cases resulted in a trial and opinion decision. See IRS data sent to author after a FOIA request
on file with author.
See, e.g., Orley Ashenfelter et a!., Politics and the Judiciary: The influence of Judicial
Background on Case Outcomes, 24 J. LEGAL STUD. 257, 259 1995 stating that bias in the
selection of disputes for trial presents problems in evaluating whether judicial ideology affects
case outcomes; Theodore Eisenberg, The Relationship Between Plaintiff Success Rates Before
Trial and at Trial, 154 J.R. STAT. Soc. 111, 1111991 "For example, if tried cases contain
equal victories for plaintiffs and defendants, one cannot conclude that the applicable legal rules
are even-handed. Even if the rules heavily favour the plaintiff, the similar trial success rates are
consistent with there being many cases in which plaintiffs recover without going to trial.";
Robert H. Gertner, Asymmetric Information, Uncertainty, and Selection Bias in Litigation, 1993
U. Cm. U. SCH. ROUNDTAELE 75, 76 "Understanding the process by which disputes settle or
fail to settle will help legal scholars unravel the biases created by the selection effect. They
might then ‘adjust’ the data on litigated cases taking the selection bias for the settlement process
into account, and thus learn more from the existing data."; Priest & Klein, supra note 1, at 3
stating that Posner’ s inference of efficiency of nineteenth century negligence law based on a
large sample of appellate cases requires the presumption that no cases involving alternative
liability standards were settled prior to appeal; Peter Siegelman & John J. Donohue III, The
Selection of Employment Disputes for Litigation: Using Business Cycle Effects to Test the
Priest-Klein Hypothesis, 24 J. LEGAL STUD 427,4291995 "If cases are not randomly selected
for litigation, then a researcher who uses litigated cases is necessarily studying both the selec
tion mechanism and the underlying population of cases simultaneously.".
As a result, the formal models of suit and settlement variously predict that the cases se
lected for trial will disproportionately be the "close" cases, the clear cases or the cases favoring
repeat litigants. See infra notes 23-35 and accompanying text.
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a case’s likelihood of going to trial.5 In fact, the validity of empirical
tests of the formal models of suit and settlement has been limited by
the strong assumptions behind the models, assumptions that generally
do not hold true in actual cases.6
This Article seeks to determine whether trials are nonrandom,
and, if they are not, which factors predict that a case will go to trial.
Unlike most other studies, this Article does not resort to limiting as
sumptions, because the data set, docketed Tax Court cases, contains
settled cases that can be directly compared to the cases in the sample
that went to trial.7 After finding that trials are nonrandom, the Article
examines the case features that predict trials, and then seeks to make
inferences from the statistical results about the applicability of theo
retical models ofsuit and settlement to actual cases. To make those
inferences, the Article also considers to what extent the Tax Court
results are analogous to other types of civil litigation.
Part I of the Article analyzes why many scholars believe that
suits are not randomly selected for trial, and why prior empirical
studies have not definitively confirmed that hypothesis. Part II dis
cusses my empirical study, the focus of this Article, which found that
docketed Tax Court cases did not settle or go to trial randomly. In
order to gain insights into suit and settlement models, Part ifi builds
on the study’s results, namely, that case characteristics such as pre
docketing administrative dispute resolution, higher stakes in the case
and certain characteristics of the judge to which the case is assigned,
increase the likelihood that a case will go to trial. This Part examines
both the key elements of the theories and the study results in light of
the theories, and also analyzes the generalizability of this study out
side the Tax Court context.
I. THE LiMrrs OF CASE-SELECTION THEORY
Resolution of a legal dispute is a multi-stage process following
an underlying event and consists of the injured party’s deciding
whether to assert a legal claim,8 the bargaining process after the claim
5See Robert D. CooLer & Daniel L. Rubinfeld, Economic Analysis of Legal Disputes and
Their Resolution, 27 J. ECON. LITERATURE 1067, 10691989 noting that empirical research on
the economics of legal disputes lags behind theoretical advances.
6The models generally assume disputes only over damages, not liability; that parties are
risk-neutral; that they form accurate and unbiased estimates of the likely outcome at trial; that
they have equal stakes in the outcome; and/or that they do not engage in strategic behavior. See
infra notes 18-21 and accompanying text.
The Tax Court is an excellent laboratory for a study of this kind because the stakes are
generally established from the outset no punitive damages can be awarded; the trials are bench
trials, so there is no need to control for collective decision-making by juries; and the Tax Court
keeps records of settled cases. See infra text accompanying note 46.
See generally Steven Shave!!, Alternative Dispute Resolution: An Economic Analysis,
24 J. LEGAL STUD. 1 1995 examining reasons why parties would choose alternative dispute
resolution ADR as opposed to trial.
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is asserted but before trial, and finally, trial.9 A dispute can be re
solved at any time in the process; analyzing only court decisions
therefore ignores the disputes that dropped out along the way. And,
in fact, most disputes do drop out before trial; as noted, the vast ma
jority of cases settle.1° Although some trials are necessary, at least to
establish precedent that assists in settling other cases,1’ trials are so
relatively rare that they are sometimes viewed as "failures" of the
system. 1
A. The Basic Model of Suit and Settlement
From an economic perspective, it is understandable why the vast
majority of cases settle. The alternative to settlement is litigation,’3
which is generally more expensive. By settling, the parties create a
"surplus" the aggregate of the amounts each would have spent to go
to trial that they can divide between them.’4 Professor Steven Shav
ell uses the following example:’5
See Cooter & Rubinfeld, supra note 5, at 1069 describing the chronology of a typical
legal dispute; see also Jeffrey M. Perloff & Daniel L. Rubinfeld, Settlements in Private Anti
trust Litigation, in PRIVATE ANTITRUST LITIGATION 149 Lawrence J. White ed., 1988 "Liti
gation consists of three interdependent strands: first, the decision by the plaintiff whether to file
suit; second, the decisions by plaintiff and defendant whether to settle; and third, the decisions
by both parties as to what type of effort to put forth during the trial.". Appeal of the trial
court’s decision is another possible step in the process.
‘°See supra note 2.
That is, parties are said to "bargain in the shadow of the law"; they factor legal rules
into the trial expectations that drive settlements. Russell Korobkin & Chris Guthrie, Psychologi
cal Barriers to Litigation Settlement: An Experimental Approach, 93 MICH. L. REv. 107, 117
1994 quoting Robert H. Mnookin & Lewis Kornhauser, Bargaining in the Shadow of the
Law: The Case of Divorce, 88 YALE U. 950 1979; see also Alexander, supra note 2, at
501-02 discussing the economic model theory that "settlement decisions are made by compar
ing the economic value of the offer to the economic value of going to trial"; Patrick E. Longan,
Congress, the Courts, and the Long Range Plan, 46 AM. U. L. REv. 625, 662 1997 "Without
question, the government should subsidize litigation to some extent because private litigants
create precedent that enables other litigants to resolve or avoid disputes; thus, that precedent has
public value.".
12
See, e.g., Samuel R. Gross & Kent D. Syverud, Don’t Try: Civil Jury Verdicts in a
System Geared to Settlement, 44 UCLA L. REv. 1, 49 1996 [hereinafter, Gross & Syverud,
Don’t Try] "The fact that trials usually are expensive winner-take-all affairs reinforces the
consensus that they are dangerous and to be shunned."; Samuel R. Gross & Kent D. Syverud,
Getting to No: A Study of Settlement Negotiations and the Selection of Cases for Trial, 90 MICH.
L. REv. 319, 320 1991 [hereinafter Gross & Syverud, Getting to No] "A trial is a failure.".
‘ Settlement is inherently tied to litigation; that is
particularly true of cases in which suit
has been filed. See Alexander, supra note 2, at 500.
See Bruce L. Hay, Effort, Information, Settlement, Trial, 24 J. LEGAL STuD. 29, 29
1995 noting that settling saves litigation costs, so parties can divide surplus created by not
litigating; James D. Miller, Using Lotteries to Expand the Range of Litigation Settlements, 26 J.
LEGAL STUD. 69, 69 1997 "Litigating parties incur deadweight losses that they could avoid if
they settled their case."; Shavell, supra note 8, at 11 "[T]he difference between the plaintiff’s
expected judgment and the defendant’s expected judgment must exceed the sum of their trial
costs for there to be a trial; otherwise they will settle to save trial costs. This makes sense, in
that the two parties together will save the sum of their trial costs if they settle." footnote omit
ted.
This example is based on the standard model of litigation, which provides that, in con
sidering an acceptable settlement amount, each side in the lawsuit determines the amount of the
expected judgment if plaintiff were to win at trial, discounted by the likelihood of plaintiff vic
tory, taking into account the costs of litigation and settlement. See Alexander, supra note 2, at
501-02. The parties base the expected judgment on precedent and other legal rules. See id. at
503. This should be true in tax cases, as well. See Andrea K. Feirstein, Note, Smith v. Comniis
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[Assume that] [t]he plaintiff believes he will win $10,000
with likelihood 70 percent, and his trial costs would be
$1,000. Thus, he would gain $7,000 $1,000 = $6,000
from trial, so he would accept any amount greater than this
in settlement. If the defendant believes the plaintiffs
chances of winning at trial are the same and would face
trial costs of $2,000, the defendant’s expected losses
would be $7,000 + $2,000 .= $9,000. Hence, the plaintiffs
minimum acceptable amount, $6,000, is below the defen
dant’s maximum acceptable amount, $9,000, so there
would be a settlement. The reason that there is a range for
settlement is that each side would have to pay trial costs;
the plaintiff subtracts these from his expected judgment to
see what he would net, and the defendant adds them to his
expected judgment to see the total he would have to pay.
Hence, the sum of trial costs, $3,000, is what separates the
plaintiffs minimum acceptable settlement amount from
the defendant’s maximum acceptable amount.’6
-

At first blush, the example suggests that it is surprising that any
cases go to trial, given the economic advantages to the parties from
sioner: Unilateral Concessions by Taxpayers, 4 VA. TAX REV. 187, 206 1984 "It is generally
assumed that a taxpayer concedes his liability only after careful calculation of several factors. A
taxpayer will multiply the full liability by an estimated probable outcome to determine the ex
pected savings to her in proceeding to thai. In determining whether to concede, a taxpayer adds
the cost of concession to the amount of expected savings. This total is then compared to the
taxpayer’s probable litigation costs to be incurred if the case is tried. If the former total is less
than or equal to the latter, the taxpayer should concede." citation omitted.
Shavell, supra note 8, at 11. This example assumes a risk-neutral plaintiff and de
fendant. See id. at 10 n.16 "I maintain the assumption of risk neutrality for simplicity in this
and the next two subsections.". "Risk neutrality" means that a party is indifferent between a
guaranteed amount, such as the $7,000 settlement in the example, and its equivalent expected
value, such as the 70% probability of a $10,000 award at thai assuming for the moment that
litigation costs are zero. See Perloff & Rubinfeld, supra note 9, at 152 "Risk neutral individu
als or firms make decisions solely on the basis of the expected return associated with their ac
tions. ... They are willing to take a ‘fair’ bet.:..". Risk aversion would increase the likeli
hood of settlement because a risk-averse party will pay more or accept less for a sure outcome
than an uncertain one. Risk-seeking behavior creates the opposite dynamic.
The example also assumes that settlement costs are zero. See Shavell, supra note 8, at 10
"Trial is assumed to involve a cost for each side, but, for simplicity, suit is taken to be cos
tless.". However, the example can easily be adapted to reflect positive settlement costs, and the
same result will still hold so long as the costs of litigating through trial are more than the costs
of settling prior to trial. In other words, another way to think about this example is that the
difference in costs incurred in settling prior to thal and going to trial is $3,000.
The economic approach to suit versus settlement should be essentially the same in Tax
Court as in other litigation. See Carlton M. Smith, Innovative Settlement Techniques Can Re
duce Litigation Costs, 8 J. TAx’N 76, 80 1993 "[In a Tax Court chambers conference, the]
judge also may ask the parties if they would be interested in hearing the judge’s tentative views
on how he or she would rule in the case, assuming the parties presented the evidence they said
they would present. The judge sometimes will give his or her views as a percentage, as in: 1
think there is a 60% chance I will rule for the petitioner on this issue.’ Giving views in this way
often lends to quick settlements on the stated percentage basis."; see also Alan J. Reyner, Rep
resenting a Client Before the IRS, 3 S.C. LAW., July-Aug. 1991, at 18, 21 "[In Tax Court,]
District Counsel will attempt to settle the case before trial and will look at all evidence as well
as at the hazards of litigation."; infra note 60 and accompanying text discussing IRS Appeals
Office’s consideration of the "hazards of litigation".
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settling.’7 However, the existence of the $3,000 settlement range in
the example depends on certain implicit assum8ptions: 1 the parties’
estimates of the trial outcome are identical,1 2 the parties have
symmetric stakes in the litigation,19 3 the parties are risk-neutral20
and 4 the parties do not engage in strategic behavior in negotiating
the division of the costs they will save by not going to trial.2 Devia
tions from any of these assumptions can eliminate a settlement range
in some cases, depending on the magnitude of the deviation from the
assumptions in relation to the stakes and the litigation costs.22
B. The Predictions of Case-Selection Models
If tried cases are those that deviate from one or more of the as
sumptions underlying the basic model reflected in the example above,
are the deviations random or are they systematic and predictable?
Scholars have intuited for some time that tried cases might differ

Of course, the economic model ignores psychological factors that may prevent settle
ment even where it would be economically justified. See generally Korobkin & Guthrie, supra
note 11 explaining the psychological barriers to a negotiated settlement.
18
See Gross & Syverud, Getting to No, supra note 12, at 324 "[I]f plaintiffs and defen
dants always agreed in their predictions of trial outcomes, there would be no trials at all.". In
fact, if all cases settled, the parties would not have the same information on which to base their
expectations of the outcome and might have more difficulty reaching a settlement because of the
absence of applicable precedent. See supra note 11 and accompanying text.
19
If a party has reputational stakes in the litigation, he will not only be motivated by the
pure economic concerns of the single litigation. See Priest & Klein, supra note 1, at 27. The
example discussed in the text assumes not only symmetry of stakes but also that the only eco
nomic concerns are those of the single litigation, not the precedential effect of the possible trial
outcome of the case as well. See infra notes 34-35 and accompanying text.
20
supra note 16 defining risk-neutrality.
21
Strategic bargaining over the division of the settlement range $3,000 in our example
can prevent settlement. Strategic behavior is posturing by a party to capture more of the surplus
created by the settlement range. See Gross & Syverud, Getting to No, supra note 12, at 328;
Robert H. Mnookin & Lewis Kornhauser, Bargaining in the Shadow of the Law: The Case of
Divorce, 88 YALE Li. 950 1979.
For example, in the example discussed above, see supra text accompanying note 16, the
plaintiff was willing to settle for anything over $6,000. For strategic purposes, however, he
might maintain that he would not settle for anything less than $8,000. If the defendant also
behaves strategically, perhaps protesting that he would not pay more than $5,000, the parties
might fail to settle despite the existence of a genuine settlement range between $6,000 and
$9,000.
The model also ignores the effects of attorneys, see generally Ronald J. Gilson & Robert
H. Mnookin, Disputing Through Agents: Cooperation and Conflict Between Layers in Litiga
tion, 94 COLUM. L. REv. 509, 512 1994; see also infra notes 116-33 and accompanying text
discussing the possible effects of attorneys. It also ignores the externalities of court opinions in
a precedent-based system. See Bruce H. Kobayashi, Case Selection, External Effects, and the
Trial/Settlement Decision, in DIsPuTE RESOLUTION: BRIDGING THE SETTLEMENT GAP 17, 17
David A. Anderson ed., 1996 stating that trials may occur because the effect of current litiga
tion on future litigation may eliminate a settlement range; see also Cooter & Rubinfeld, supra
note 5, at 1070.
22
See, e.g., Jeffrey M. Perloff et al., Antitrust Settlements and Trial Outcomes, 78 REV.
OF ECON. & STATS. 401 1996 "Failure to settle may occur for at least three reasons. First, the
plaintiff’s expected gains may outweigh the defendant’s expected losses either because the
plaintiff believes its probability of winning is greater than does the defendant, or because the
plaintiff expects a larger award at trial than does the defendant. Second, one or both parties
might enjoy taking risks, or their lawyers may have a fmancial interest in the hours generated by
a trial. Third. . . ‘breakdowns’ of the settlement bargaining process may occur when parties
have informational asymmetries
.
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systematically from cases that settled,23 Beginning with Priest and
Klein’s landmark article,24 scholars have used formal economic mod
els to predict the selection of specific types of cases for trial, given
certain assumptions. In fact, each of the formal models of settlement
allows a deviation from one of the assumptions of the basic model of
suit and settlement that was illustrated by the numerical example
above, while holding the other assumptions constant.25 Each of these
models predicts a different selection of cases for trial, but, notably, all
three of the formal models predict a nonrandom selection of cases for
trial.
Priest and Klein’s model is based on the "divergent expecta
tions" of the parties; it allows deviation from the basic model’s as
sumption that parties’ estimates of the likely outcome at trial are
identical. Their model allows for differences in opinion about the
likely outcome based on self-serving estimation bias. By further
assuming a certain distribution of the parties’ errors in making those
estimates,27 and by maintaining the other assumptions of the basic
model-that is, risk-neutrality, equal stakes and the absence of strate
gic behavior-Priest and Klein predict in their basic model28 that the
"close" cases those closest to the standard of decision in the case
will be disproportionately selected for trial.29 The "implication" of
23See, e.g., KARL N. LLEWELLYN, THE BRAMBLE BUsH: ON OUR LAW AND ITS STUDY
58 1960 stating that litigated cases bear the same relationship to the underlying pool of dis
putes "as does homicidal mania or sleeping sickness, to our normal life.", quoted in Priest &
Klein, supra note 1, at 2.
24P.tiest & Klein, supra note 1.
25 See supra note
16 and accompanying text.
Each of the models allows a deviation from one of the assumptions of I identical party
outcome estimates, 2 symmetric stakes, 3 risk-neutrality or 4 lack of strategic behavior,
while maintaining the other three assumptions. See Gross & Syverud, Getting to No, supra note
12, at 324 "[I]f plaintiffs and defendants always agreed in their predictions of trial outcomes,
there would be no trials at all.".
26
The Priest/Klein approach is a type of "optimism" model because it bases parties’ dif
ferent estimates in the expected outcome of a trial not on asymmetric information, but on mere
differences in opinion, given identical information. See Gertner, supra note 3, at 81, 81 n.20.
Party "pessimism" about the likely outcome at trial would in fact increase the settlement range,
see Id. at 81 n.19, so the only possible reason trials could be caused by estimation errors is if
parties are systematically biased in favor of over-estimating the chances of a favorable outcome.
Such "optimism" can occur because each party might tend to estimate trial outcomes through a
lens that
resolves uncertainty in his favor.
27
The Priest/Klein model assumes that in estimating the likely trial outcome, the parties
make random estimation errors that are independent of each other, normally distributed and with
a mean of zero. The model requires the assumption that the parties’ errors in estimating out
come are homoskedastic, that is, that the error does not vary according to how close the case is
to the decision standard. See Kobayashi, supra note 21, at 23 n. 18,
28
Priest and Klein also consider the effect of differential stakes to the parties. See Priest
& Klein, supra note 1, at 24-29. Under their model, litigation is relatively more likely when the
party with the greater stakes has a higher probability of winning. See id. at 25.
29
In the basic Priest/Klein model, damages are stipulated and there are only two possible
trial outcomes: liability in which the defendant is required to pay the plaintiff the stipulated
stakes, say $10,000, as damages and non-liability in which the defendant pays nothing to the
plaintiff. See id. at 17. For example, if damages are stipulated at $10,000, and the plaintiff will
win the $10,000 only if the defendant is found negligent, "negligence" is the decision standard.
Priest and Klein postulate that a particular dispute might have any degree of liability-indicative
facts. Any particular dispute, therefore, will lie somewhere on the scale that the decision stan
dard divides into a zone of liability and a zone of non-liability. The "decision standard" is the
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this theory is that the plaintiff will win 50% of tried cases again, as
suming fixed stakes.3 Priest and Klein tested the "50 percent impli
cation" on a data set of contested civil cases and found support for
their theory,3’ but other scholars’ studies on different data sets gener
ally have not supported the 50 percent implication.32
Subsequent to the Priest and Klein study, other scholars ad
vanced alternative theories of the nonrandom selection of cases for
trial. Asymmetric information models, also based on divergent ex
pectations by the parties, allow party estimates of outcome to differ
not based on party optimism but based instead on information held by
only one party asymmetric information, so that one side has a truer
estimate of the likely outcome at trial. Unlike Priest and Klein’s
model, which predicts that the close cases will be tried, asymmetric
information models predict that the "easy" cases will go to trial be
cause the party with the information will only settle where he knows
he has a weaker than average case; other cases will tend to go to trial
"adverse selection".33
A third model of case selection, less well known, focuses on the
possibility of unequal stakes, specifically in the context of the value
of the precedent that results from trial. This model assumes no esti
mation errors, and maintains the other assumptions of the basic
model. The model predicts, based on certain additional assumptions,
that cases that go to trial will tend to be those in which the legal rule
is inefficient or, where the parties’ stakes are unequal, those cases in
rule dividing those cases in which the decision-maker will find the defendant liable from those
cases in which he will not. Under Priest and Klein’s assumptions, the cases selected for trial are
disproportionately those closest to the decision standard in the case the "selection effect"
because estimation errors will be greater in those cases. See id.
It is implicit in Priest and Klein’s model that the decision-maker will always accurately
determine on which side of the decision standard a particular dispute lies, and that no disputes
fall on the line. In other words, any error by the decision-maker is already factored into the
location of the decision standard. Therefore, although it may appear to litigants that outcomes
in cases closest to the decision standard are "as uncertain as coin tosses," Keith N. Hylton, Fee
Shifting and Predictability of Law, 71 CHI.-KENT. L. REv. 427, 436-37 1995, in fact, the
outcome is always certain, it is just unknown to the parties until the decision-maker announces
the decision.
°
The 50 percent implication results from Priest and Klein’s assumption that filed cases
are distributed approximately symmetrically around the decision standard and that tried cases
are disproportionately those closest to the decision standard. See Kobayashi, supra note 21, at
21.
31
Priest & Klein, supra note 1, at 33.
32
See infra note 37.
Adverse selection can occur under asymmetric information models because the party
with private information has an incentive to accept a settlement offer from the uninformed party
only if the chances that the informed party will win at trial are less than those of the average
litigant. See Miller, supra note 14, at 72.
See Paul H. Rubin, Why Is the Common Law Efficient?, 6 1. LEGAL STuD. 51, 54
1977. In the model it is applied to, the current liability rule requires a particular party such as
the defendant to bear the costs of avoidance and future liability. If the suit is litigated and the
plaintiff wins, the liability rule remains the same, so avoidance and liability Costs are un
changed. On the other hand, if the defendant wins, the liability rule will be reversed, so that the
defendant no longer bears those costs, and the plaintiff must bear them. Under the model, the
process will continue, if both sides have a substantial interest in precedents, until the liability
rule is on the low-cost avoider, who will find it less expensive to avoid liability than to litigate.
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which the outcome is disproportionately likely to favor the "repeat
player," that is, the party with an interest in establishing a precedent.
C. Dfficulties in Testing the Models
The prediction of each of these models for which cases will be
selected for trial flows directly from the restrictive assumptions under
the respective model. If, for example, the only cause of trials is party
estimation error based on optimism, and if Priest and Klein’s as
sumption that party estimation error is systematic is valid, then the
cases that fail to settle will be the cases closest to the applicable "de
cision standard," as Priest and Klein predict. The prediction follows
directly from the assumptions, so in order to test Priest and Klein’s
hypothesis on actual cases, a study would need to either test whether
the assumptions hold true within the data set or whether the prediction
based on the assumptions is borne out by the data. Of course, neither
approach is realistic. It is unlikely that there is one sole cause of tri
als, and similarly unlikely that assumptions such as risk-neutrality,
equal stakes and lack of strategic bargaining are true of every case in
a data set. Empirical studies of Priest and Klein’s hypothesis reflect
this problem: many scholars have tested the 50 percent implication of
Thus, cases that go to trial will disproportionately be those where the law inefficiently places
liability on the high-cost avoider.
If the model is correct in predicting which cases will go to trial, and if there is a positive
probability that inefficient liability rules will be reversed at trial, this model implies that the law
will evolve towards efficiency over time. The evolution toward efficiency implication has been
questioned by some scholars. See, e.g., Robert Cooter & Lewis Kornhauser, Can Litigation
Improve the Law Without the Help of Judges?, 9 J. LEGAL STUD. 139, 153-54 1980 noting
that such factors as strategic bargaining can cause cases to go to trial whether the resulting
precedent is efficient or inefficient; Cooter & Rubinfeld, supra note 5 stating that economic
models of legal change demonstrated only a weak tendency towards efficiency; Georg von
Wangenheim, The Evolution of Judge Made Law, 13 INT’L REV. L. & Ec0N. 381, 382-83 dis
cussing why public choice theory must be considered in hypothesizing which legal rules are
challenged in the judicial process. However, the validity of asymmetric information as an
explanation for why some cases go to trial does not depend on the evolution toward efficiency
implication because of the additional assumptions required for the implication to hold.
°
See Kobayashi, supra note 21, at 37 noting that the selection of cases "is biased to
ward those cases likely to result in holdings favorable to the repeat litigant
; Rubin, supra
note 34, at 55; see also Frank B. Cross, The Precedent-Setting Value of Litigation and the Se
lection of Cases for Trial unpublished working paper on file with author arguing precedentsetting value of a case plays a major role in selection of cases for trial.
If only one party has a substantial interest in the precedent resulting from trial, cases that
go to trial will not be those that reflect inefficient liability rules, but rather those cases likely to
result in holdings favorable to repeat litigants. Bruce Kobayashi uses the following example:
Assume that two similarly situated plaintiffs proceed sequentially and independently against a
common defendant. In the first action, the plaintiff faces no external effects but the defendant
does because of the effect precedent in the first trial will have on the second trial. See Kobaya
shi, supra note 21, at 37 "The one-sided demand for precedent will cause there to be asymmet
ric stakes to litigation, causing the defendant to spend more on litigation than the plaintiff, and
tilting the distribution of trial outcomes toward defendants.". As demonstrated by the numeri
cal example above, see supra text accompanying note 16, in a situation in which only the defen
dant faces external gains from a favorable trial outcome, as the external gains generated by the
defendant from a trial victory increase, the case is more likely to go to trial. Conversely, as the
defendant’s estimate of the plaintiff’s likelihood of prevailing increases, or the defendant’s
external cost of losing at trial increases, the case will be less likely to go to trial. See Kobayashi,
supra note 21, at 37. Thus, tried cases will be disproportionately selected from those with
holdings that are likely to favor repeat litigants.
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Priest and Klein’s hypothesis,36 and have found that it does not hold.37
However, other scholars have noted that this does not disprove Priest
and Klein’s "selection effect" theory because deviations from the 50
percent prediction can always be explained by deviations from the
underlying assumptions.38
Testing the real-life applicability of the suit and settlement mod
els more directly than by simply examining plaintiff victory rates is
even more difficult. First, it is difficult to obtain information about
settled cases,39 and with only tried cases in a sample, it is impossible
36 See Gross
& Syverud, Getting to No, supra note 12, at 325 "To a remarkable extent,
this ‘fifty percent implication,’ which Priest also describes as the ‘principle [sic] empirical heu
ristic of the model,’ has come to overshadow the more general selection effect." Id. at 327
"However limiting its assumptions, the fifty percent hypothesis has the virtue of being easy to
remember, and apparently easy to test. It seems that such tests require only information about
trial outcomes, which are much more accessible to researchers than settlement negotiations.
And tested the fifty percent hypothesis has been, on datasets [sic] as diverse as wrongful death
cases in Japan, civil rights cases in federal courts, challenges to federal agency decisionmaking,
and state court appellate decisions. The tests, however, are often unsatisfying. On the one hand,
a finding of a fifty percent success rate is too rarely accompanied by an inquiry into whether the
underlying assumptions of the model are actually met. On the other hand, a deviation from a
fifty percent rate can almost always be explained as a failure of one or more of these essential
assumptions rather than a failure of the hypothesis itself." citation omitted.
Disproving the 50 percent implication disproves the specific selection effect developed
by Priest and Klein. However, proof of the 50 percent implication is strong evidence of the
selection effect but does not rule out the possibility of a 50% victory rate occurring by chance.
See, e.g., Daniel Kessler et al., Explaining Deviations from the Ffiy Percent Rule, 25 J.
LEGAL STUD. 233, 236-42 1996 reviewing over 20 articles that have found that plaintiff suc
cess rates do not approximate 50%; see also Kevin M. Clermont & Theodore Eisenberg, Trial
by Jury or Judge: Transcending Empiricism, 77 CORNELL L. REv. 1124 1992 stating that
only 22 of 93 categories of bench trial cases show plaintiff success rates of between 45% and
55%; only 16 of 93 categories of jury trial cases show plaintiff success rates of between 45%
and 55%; Patricia Munch Danzon & Lee A. Lillard, Settlement Out of Court: The Disposition
of Medical Malpractice Claims, 12 J. LEGAL STUD. 345 1983 demonstrating a 26.8% plaintiff
success rate; Theodore Eisenberg, Testing the Selection Effect: A New Theoretical Framework
with Empirical Tests, 19 J. LEGAL STuD. 337, 339 1980 concluding data are inconclusive;
Eisenberg, supra note 3, app. A finding only 16 of 73 subject matter categories show plaintiff
success rates of between 45% and 55%; Theodore Eisenberg & Sheri Lynn Johnson, The Ef
fects of Intent: Do We Know How Legal Standards Work?, 76 CORNELL L. REv. 1151, 1172
1991 finding a 40% plaintiff success rate; Gross & Syverud, Getting to No, supra note 12, at
333 finding a 51.4% plaintiff success rate; Priest & Klein, supra note 1, at 33 showing plain
tiff success rates of 45.6%, 49.5% and 53.0%; J. Mark Ramseyer & Minoru Nakazato, The
Rational Litigant: Settlement Amounts and Verdict Rates in Japan, 18 J. LEGAL STUD. 263, 28185 1989 finding plaintiff success rates of 78% and 81.9%. See generally Gross and Syverud,
Getting to No, supra note 12, at 327 criticizing 50 percent implication; Vicki Schultz & Ste
phen Patterson, Race, Gender, Work, and Choice: An Empirical Study of the Lack of Interest
Defense in Title VII Cases Challenging Job Segregation, 59 U. CHI. L. REv. 1073 1992
finding plaintiff success rates of 49.2% and 46.3%; Donald Wittman, Dispute Resolution,
Bargaining, and the Selection of Cases for Trial: A Study of the Generation of Biased and
Unbiased Data, 27 J. LEGAL STUD. 313, 345 1988 finding plaintiff success rates of 83% and
84%. But cf Joel Waldfogel, The Selection Hypothesis and the Relationship Between Trial and
Plaintiff Victory, 103 J. POL. ECON. 229, 230 1995 finding empirical support for a selection
effect under
the Priest/Klein model.
‘
See Kobayashi, supra note 21, at 27 stating that lack of empirical support for the 50
percent implication in data sets of actual cases is not surprising, given the strong assumptions
behind it; see, e.g., Siegelman & Donohue, supra note 3, at 429-30 stating deviations from the
50 percent rule in actual data sets might be explained by cases that are disputes over damages
rather than liability, thus inflating plaintiff observed win rates, and by differential stakes, which,
as predicted by Priest and Klein, would lead to systematic deviations from a 50% plaintiff suc
cess rate.
See Wittman, supra note 37, at 345 "Most disputes are settled out of court, but the
characteristics of these disputes and the amounts settled upon are rarely known to the public.";
cf Gross & Syverud, Getting to No, supra note 12, at 324-25 "Since [Priest and Klein’s theory]
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to determine how the cases that settled differ from the cases that went
to trial.40 This may explain the extent of scholars’ focus on Priest and
Klein’s 50 percent implication,4’ which only requires a look at out
comes in tried cases. Second, the same problem of controlling for the
limiting assumptions of a model quickly arises.42 Third, evaluating
the accuracy of the model would depend on judgment calls such as
how close a case was to the "decision standard" or whether the facts
of a particular case favored a party with private information or a re
peat player. Thus, empirical studies of which cases settle have gener
ally been limited to inconclusive tests on tried cases of Priest and
Klein’s 50 percent implication.43
The three models discussed above are the most formal frame
works for predicting which cases go to trial. However, there are other
theories for why cases go to trial. In particular, some scholars hy
pothesize that principal-agent problems between parties and their atis a comparative assertion cases tried are closer to the decision standard than cases settled, it
requires data on both settlements and trials.".
4°See, e.g, Gross & Syverud, Getting to No, supra note 12, at 321 "Our hope is to learn
something about how pretrial bargaining works by examining those cases in which it did not
work-a method similar, perhaps, to studying the operation of an assembly line by looking at
the rejects."; Korobkin & Guthrie, supra note 11, at 119 n.48 "There may be important subtle
ties about settlement that cannot be gleaned from examples of nonsettlement.".
41
See supra note 37 and accompanying text.
42
See supra notes 36-37 and accompanying text; see also Kessler et al., supra note 37, at
233 stating that multimodal case characteristics associated with violations of Priest and Klein’s
assumptions cause plaintiff win rates to deviate from the 50% result implied by Priest and
Klein’s theory.
‘°
There are a few exceptions. Two suit and settlement studies used simulations, rather
than actual cases, to test the underlying Priest/Klein hypothesis that cases closest to the "deci
sion standard" are disproportionately selected for trial. See Linda R. Stanley & Donald L. Cour
sey, Empirical Evidence on the Selection Hypothesis and the Decision to litigate or Settle, 19 J.
LEGAL STUD. 145, 151-52 1990 using undergraduates to divvy up chips in an urn; Robert E.
Thomas, The Trial Selection Hypothesis Without the 50 Percent Rule: Some Experimental Evi
dence, 24 J. LEGAL STUD. 209, 2111995 using business school students and a computer
program that simulated legal disputes.
One large study of private antitrust litigation on cases filed in five federal district courts
used a follow-up survey to all of the parties or their attorneys that "yielded a limited amount of
data on.. . settlements." Steven C. Salop & Lawrence I. White, Private Antitrust Litigation: An
Introduction and Framework, in PRIVATE ANTITRUST LITIGATION: NEW EVIDENCE, NEW
LEARNING 3-4 Lawrence J. White ed., 1988. That data was used to simulate the effect on
settlement of reducing the treble damages multiplier. See Perloff & Rubinfeld, supra note 9, at
149. That study revealed differences in which cases settled that depended on the nature of the
plaintiffs and defendants involved. See Id. at 162-63. However, some of the cases characterized
as "settlements" in that data set were dismissals that may actually have been defendant victories.
See Salop & White, supra, at 11. Moreover, the survey results probably did not give a random
sample of settled cases. Perloff, Rubinfeld and Ruud also used the data to develop a model of
determinants of trial outcome. See Perloff et al., supra note 22, at 401. In that study, they
dropped certain types of cases that may not have been true settlements. See id. at 404 n.lO.
In the context of medical malpractice, Danzon and Lillard found in part that the propen
sity to litigate increases with the size of the potential verdict and decreases if there are limits on
contingent fees. Danzon & Lillard, supra note 37, at 365, 366. Their study focused on pre
senting estimates of a model of disposition of medical malpractice claims, despite unobserved
variables requiring estimates. See Id. at 346. The data was drawn from two surveys of insur
ance company claims, which they describe as "broadly representative but not strictly random
ized samples of claims against physicians and hospitals." Id. at 354.
Also in the context of medical malpractice, Farber and White found that cases with negli
gent care were much less likely to be dropped before the lawsuit stage than cases with good
care. See Henry S. Farber & Michelle J. White, A Comparison of Formal and lnformal Dispute
Resolution in Medical Malpractice, 23 J. LEGAL STuD. 777,797 1994.
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torneys can cause cases to fail to sett1e. Similarly, strategic bar
gaining can preclude settlements. In addition, certain techniques may
facilitate settlement, such as alternative dispute resolution ADR
procedures and judicial "activism" in encouraging settlement. Since
these theories have not been formally modeled, they have not been
tested in controlled studies.
II. WHICH CASES Go TO TRIAL?: THE SmoY OF Tx CouiT CASES
In contrast to prior work, the study that is the focus of this Arti
cle was performed on a data set of cases of which approximately half
settled and the other half went to trial.45 The data consisted of a ran
dom sample of about 400 recent cases docketed in Tax Court.
These cases present an unusual opportunity to test for nonrandomness
of trials because, unlike most courts, the Tax Court keeps records of
settled cases.47
In order to avoid the problem of limiting assumptions that are
not true of actual cases, and the problem of subjective judgments
about the merits of a case, the study tested for nonrandomness by
comparing the attributes of tried cases in the sample with the attrib
utes of settled cases in the sample. This approach allows a major ad
vance in testing whether cases go to trial or settle randomly. More
specifically, the study tested whether any of nine characteristics of a
case were statistically significant predictors48 of the type of out
come-ti-jal or settlement.49 As discussed below, the nine variables
infra notes 117-33 and accompanying text.
The data in this study reflect two possible outcomes: trial or settlement. A settlement is
a case in which the Tax Court enters a "stipulated decision." See infra note 47. It is possible
that one or more settlements occurred during or after trial, but before the judge’s decision in the
case. Such cases would be reflected as stipulated decisions, and therefore, settlements. How
ever, for simplicity, this Article refers to settlements as having occurred prior to trial.
See Appendix A for an explanation of data-collection techniques; see Appendix D for a
description of the data.
In Tax Court, if the IRS and the taxpayer agree on a settlement figure in a docketed
case, their agreement is put in the form of a written stipulation. This stipulation is filed with the
Tax Court, which enters its decision in accordance with it, as a "stipulated decision." See RIA
FEDERAL TAX COORDINATOR 2d ¶ T-l909 1988. The Tax Court retains the full file in that
case for one year after entry of the stipulated decision. See infra note 158 and accompanying
text. I refer to cases in which a stipulated decision was entered by the Tax Court as "settled"
cases. The remaining cases in my sample are opinion decisions, which I refer to as "tried"
cases. 48
As with any study on actual disputes, my data could not directly test whether any of the
models correctly predicts which cases go to trial. However, as discussed below, the study re
sults do allow inferences about the applicability of the theoretical models to Tax Court cases.
See infra notes 136-5 1 and accompanying text.
4°
As explained below, the predictive effect of each variable, controlling for the other
variables, was done using a statistical technique called multiple regression analysis. See Ap
pendix B. Performing a multiple regression analysis requires selecting only some of the multi
tude of characteristics that are possible trial predictors because including too many variables can
preclude measurement of the characteristics that are valid predictors. See Mark A. Hall et al.,
Judicial Protection of Managed Care Consumers: An Empirical Study of Insurance Coverage
Disputes, 26 SETON HALL L. REv. 1055, 1066 1996 "Including too many factors can reduce
the utility of the analysis because several of the factors are likely to be measuring the same
4°
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were chosen by considering what factors might influence settlement
in Tax Court, based on the Tax Court litigation process and on theo
ries about factors that might influence the selection ofcases for trial.5°
The statistical technique of multiple regression analysis was used to
test whether any particular case feature or features, controlling for
other aspects of the case, indicated an increased likelihood that the
case would go to trial.51
In selecting variables as possible trial predictors, it is important
to consider the characteristics of cases in the data set. The cases used
in this study were all docketed Tax Court cases, so they share certain
attributes, and also differ from each other in specific ways. It is these
differences, such as whether the taxpayer is represented or pro se, that
can be used to test whether cases go to trial randomly. Each of the
nine variables used in the study, "STAKES," "APPEALS,"
"JUDGETYPE," "DECADE," "BACKGROUND," "PARTY,"
"TAXPAYER," "REGION" and "COUNSEL,"52 reflects a charac
teristic of either the case itself, the taxpayer involved in the case or
the judge assigned to the case.
The Tax Court exclusively hears civil federal tax cases.53 Most
of the cases are "deficiency" cases in which the Internal Revenue
Service IRS has mailed the taxpayer a "notice of deficiency," in
forming the taxpayer that the IRS has determined that the taxpayer
under-reported its tax liability,55 in response to which the taxpayer has
Prior to the notice of deficiency, the taxpayer, whose return was peti

phenomenon at once. In such an event, most or all of the factors will appear insignificant, even
though in combination they explain a great deal of the observed variation in outcome.".
°
Cf Perloff & Rubinfeld, supra note 9, at 164 "We hypothesize that the settlement gap
is a function of the characteristics of the case and the litigants as well as differences in the courts
which may vary by jurisdiction and over time.".
See Appendix B for an explanation of this statistical procedure.
52
Each of the variables had two to six parameters. Because the variables I used have
values that fall into categories, rather than ranges of values such as special trial judge or regular
judge, each independent variable had a reference group and one or more additional groups. See
generally MICHAEL 0. FINKRLsTnIN & BRUCE LEVIN, STATISTICS FOR LAWYERS 358 1990.
See Appendix C for a list of the variables and the groups within each independent variable.
Although STAKES dollar amount at stake could have been analyzed as a continuous variable,
it was treated as a categorical variable by dividing the cases into four categories that roughly
correspond to the categories generally used in discussions of Tax Court cases.
Approximately 95% of litigated civil federal tax cases are heard by the Tax Court. See
Leandra Lederman, "Civil"izing Tax Procedure: Applying General Federal Learning to Statu
toly Notices of Deficiency, 30 U.C. DAVIS L. REv. 183, 185 1996; Hon. David Laro, The
Evolution of the Tax Court as an Independent Tribunal, 1995 U. ILL. L. REV. 17, 18 1995;
Hon. Theodore Tannenwald, Jr., The Tax Litigation Process: Where It Is and Where It Is Going,
44 REC. ASS’N B. CrrY N.Y. 825, 827 1989. The other 5% go to the United States Court of
Federal Claims or the United States District Courts. See Id.
4° MICHAEL I. SALTZMAN, IRS PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE 2d ed. 1991 ¶ 8.06[5J[aJ.
I.R.C. 6212a authorizes the notice of deficiency. See I.R.C. § 6212a 1997.
For Tax Court jurisdiction, the taxpayer must petition the Tax Court in response to the
notice of deficiency. See Lederman, supra note 53, at 185, 185 n. 13. If a taxpayer petitions the
Tax Court without having received a notice of deficiency, the court will dismiss the case for
lack of subject matterjurisdiction. See I.R.C. § 6213a 1997 requiring notice of deficiency
for Tax Court jurisdiction.
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tioned the Tax Court.56 STAKES generally reflects the deficiency
amount in the notice.
Prior to the notice of deficiency, the taxpayer, whose return was
audited,57 likely received a "30-day 1etter"5 from the IRS,59 which
notified him of the right to request an administrative appeal from the
IRS Appeals Office in response to the letter.6° The Appeals Office is
explicitly authorized to consider the "hazards of litigation," and con
siders its mission to be the settlement of cases;61 it settles approxi
mately 90% of the cases it considers,62 and it sends a notice of defi
ciency only to taxpayers whose cases do not settle.63 If a taxpayer
does not respond to the 30-day letter, the Appeals Office will send a
notice of deficiency. The taxpayer has 90 this from the date of the
notice of deficiency to petition the Tax Court.
Docketed Tax Court
4°
See supra note 55; see also Lederman, supra note 53, at 195 explaining Tax Court
subject matter jurisdiction.
Taxpayers are selected for audit based on a complex formula with a multitude of vari
ables, called the DIF discriminant function. See SALTZMAN, supra note 54, ¶ 8.03[1], [2].
Variables used in the DIF are developed from a Taxpayer Management Compliance Program
TCMP, which the IRS has conducted approximately once every three years. See id.
¶ 8.03[l][b]. Data from the TCMP is used to develop variables for the DIF that are the most
likely to target returns with the greatest possibility of error. See id. All returns selected by the
DIF are examined manually by a trained professional before they are selected for audit. See id.

SALTZMAN, supra note 54, ¶ 8.03[l][a]; Treas. Reg.

§ 601 .l05dliv 1998.
This assumes that the auditing agent did not accept the return as filed, and that the tax
payer did not concede the case at the administrative level; for the case to be properly docketed
in Tax Court, the taxpayer must have received a notice of deficiency and petitioned the court.
See supra note 55.
60
The 30-day letter informs the taxpayer of his right to request a conference with the IRS
Regional Office of Appeals. See supra note 55. When the tax deficiency is more than $10,000,
the request must include a written protest explaining the taxpayer’s position. See Treas. Reg. §
601 .105d2iii 1998.
The Appeals Office is of course an office within the administrative agency that initiated
the dispute, the IRS. This may result in bias on the part of Appeals Office in favor of the IRS.
See Philip Elman, Administrative Reform of the Federal Trade Commission, 59 GEO. L.J. 777,
778 1971; Richard A. Posner, The Behavior of Administrative Agencies, 1 J. LEGAL STUD.
305, 324 1972. One implication of such bias might be a tendency to settle few cases, if that
were seen as a sign of IRS error in sending a 30-day letter. See Posner, supra, at 324-25. The
IRS Appeals Office, however, apparently views its mission as settlement, see infra note 61, and
settles the overwhelming majority of its cases, see George Guttman, IRS Averages: Winning
Little, Losing Big, 61 TAx NOTES 155, 156 Oct. 11, 1993 "Unless there is an IRS policy to
the contrary, the hearing Officer in the Appeals Office makes a settlement offer on the basis of
the quality of the case set up by the auditor and the hazards of litigation. For example, if the
Officer thinks that the IRS has only a 30-percent chance of succeeding in litigation, an offer will
be made to settle the case for 30 cents on the dollar.".
61
INTERNAL REVENUE MANUAL 8131 2, MT 8-188 Jan. 9, 1989 Appeals Mission.
62
See Guttman, supra note 60, at 156 "On the whole, the IRS disposes of about 90 per
cent of the cases by settlement. In fiscal 1992, it settled 67,251 out of 74,591 appealed cases.".
63
See 26 C.F.R. § 601.l06d2ii 1998. The IRS Appeals Office settles approxi
mately 90% of its cases, so cases that have not yet been to the Appeals Office and are referred
there by the Tax Court might be more likely to settle than those that made it out of the Appeals
Office without settling. See JAMES E. MERRITT, ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURES: REPRE
SENTATION BEFORE THE IRS APPEALS Orictt, SB47 ACI-ABA 89 Oct. 17, 1996.
4° See I.R.C. § 6213 1997; SALTZMAN, supra note 54, ¶ 9.03[3]. Filing a petition com
mences the Tax Court case. See TAX CT. R. 20. Cases in this study, both settled and tried,
reflect those in which the taxpayer chose to petition the Tax Court in response to the notice of
deficiency.
If the taxpayer does not file a Tax Court petition, the taxpayer can either pay, effectively
conceding the case, or pay and claim a refund, prolonging the dispute with the possibility of
suing for a refund in district court or the Court of Federal Claims if the claim is denied. See
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cases that brpassed the Appeals Office are referred there for possible
settlement.6 The APPEALS variable reflects whether the case went
to the Appeals Office prior to docketing where it must have failed to
settle in order to be included in the sample or post-docketing.
The Tax Court is an Article I court so all of its trials are bench
trials.67 Four of the study’s variables focused on characteristics of the
judge assigned to the case,68 JUDGETYPE reflects whether the case
was assigned to a Tax Court judge or to a Special Trial Judge. Spe
cial Trial Judges, appointed by the Chief Judge of the Tax Court, hear
most of the "small tax cases," cases involving informal procedures for
disputes involving dollar amounts limited by statute, and they hear
Ledennan, supra note 53, at 186 n.h. If the taxpayer does not pay the tax or petition the Tax

Court in response to a statutory notice, the IRS can assess the tax and, after notice and demand
from the IRS, the taxpayer will be obligated to pay the tax. See I.R.C. § 6213c. In order for a
refund court to have jurisdiction over a refund suit, the taxpayer must first have made full pay
ment of the tax assessed. See Flora v. United States, 362 U.S. 145 1960; Shore v. United
States, 9 F.3d 1524 Fed. Cir. 1993. The taxpayer must also file a timely refund claim with the
IRS. See I.R.C. § 7422a 1997; United States v. DaIm, 494 U.S. 596, 601-02 1990; see also
I.R.C. § 6511 1997 setting a limitation on claims for credits or refunds for overpayment of
taxes. The taxpayer can not file suit until either six months have elapsed from the time he filed
the claim or when the IRS sends a notice of disallowance of the claim. See I.R.C. § 6532 1997.
65See Rev. Proc. 87-24, 1987-1 C.B. 720; SALTZMAN, supra note 54, ¶ 9.03[4]. The Ap
peals Office retains sole jurisdiction over the case until IRS District Counsel requests return of
the file to prepare for trial. See Smith, supra note 16, at 77. A 1986 General Accounting Office
study found that 62% of the cases closed in 1984 where the taxpayer had initially bypassed the
Appeals Office were eventually settled by the Appeals Office. Increased use of IRS’ Appeals
process prior to Tax Court Petition Recommended by GAO Study, RIA WEEKLY ALERT Sept.
11, 1986.
See I.R.C. § 7441 1997; Tax Reform Act of 1969, Pub. L. No. 91 -172 § 951, 83 StaL
730 1969. It is the successor to the Board of Tax Appeals, also an Article I court. See Reve
nue Act of 1942, ch. 619, § 504a, 56 Stat. 957 1942 providing for a name change from the
"Board of Tax Appeals" to "The Tax Court of the United States".
67
See I.R.C. § 7459b 1997; William F. Nelson & James J. Keightley, Managing the
Tax Court Inventory, 7 VA. TAX REV. 451, 453 1988. The court is located in Washington,
D.C., but the judges travel for regular calendars in cities around the country. See I.R.C. § 7446
1997. The small case division was established by the Tax Reform Act of 1969. See Pub. L.
No. 9 1-172 § 957 a, 960 a, b and I. The Tax Court hears small cases in several addi
tional cities. See I.R.C. § 7453; TAX COURT R. 177a.
6$
Because of the relatively large number of judges in the sample relative to the number
of cases collected, it was not possible to test the effect of each individual judge on case out
come. Testing each of the nine independent variables separately assumes independence of each
variable from the other. Because many judges in the sample decided more than one case each,
that assumption was technically violated. However, grouping judges by four specific charac
teristics mitigated the problem of lack of independence.
69 Code section 7463 authorizes
special proceedings the "S procedure" for petitions
filed with the Tax Court where neither the amount of the deficiency placed in dispute including
additions to tax nor the amount of any claimed overpayment exceeds $10,000 for any one tax
able year. See I.R.C. § 7463al, e 1997 prior to 1998 amendment. This section also
allows the S procedure where neither the amount of the deficiency placed in dispute nor the
amount of any claimed overpayment exceeds $10,000 in the case of any tax imposed by chapter
11; $10,000 for any one calendar year, in the case of any tax imposed by chapter 12; or $10,000
for any one taxable period or taxable event in the case of any tax imposed by subtitle D which is
described in section 6212. The "small case" division uses less formal procedures in return for a
waiver of the right of appeal. See I.R.C. § 7463; HoN. SAMUEL B. STERRETF, UNITET STATES
TAx CouRT: ITs ORIGIN ANt FUNCTIONS 7 1986. Code section 7463 was amended in 1998 to
increase the dollar limit from $10,000 to $50,000. See I.R.C. § 7463 1997 amended 1998.
The taxpayer essentially has the unilateral option to elect this procedure; it is not by
agreement of the parties, so it is not equivalent to a partial settlement. Cf. Samuel R. Gross,
Settlingfor a Judge: A Comment on Clermont and Eisenberg, 77 CORNELL L. REv. 1178, 1180
1992 stating that in cases in which bench trial is not mandatory, in effect it requires both
parties’ agreement and thus represents a partial settlement. Because the Tax Court would not
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other cases as well.7° In any case involving more than the statutory
dollar limit, a Special Trial Judge’s opinion must be adopted by a
regular judge.71 Those opinions are publicly available, but opinions
in small tax cases are generally written as Summary Opinions, which
generally have not been available to the public,72 so fewer opinions by
Special Trial Judges are publicly available than those decided by
regular Tax Court judges.
DECADE, BACKGROUND and PARTY also reflect judge
characteristics. DECADE is the decade in which the judge was ap
pointed to the bench; BACKGROUND is his pre-Tax Court back
ground: private sector, government or both; PARTY is the political
party of the President who appointed the judge, or, in the case of Spe
cial Trial Judges, of the President who appointed the Chief Judge who
appointed the Special Trial Judge.73
TAXPAYER reflects whether the taxpayer was an individual,
corporation or estate. REGION reflects the region of the country the
taxpayer resided in at the time he filed the Tax Court petition. Region
might ex ante be significant because the IRS is represented in Tax
Court by attorneys in District Counsels’ offices around the country.
In addition, although the Tax Court is a national court, Tax Court de
cisions may be appealed to the court of appeals for the circuit in
which the taxpayer resided at the time he filed the Tax Court peti
tion.74 If that court of appeals has decided a case squarely on point on
a particular issue, that precedent is applicable in Tax Court.75
Finally, COUNSEL reflects whether the taxpayer appeared pro
se or was represented by counsel. Taxpayers may be represented by
members of the Tax Court Bar, who may be attorneys, or other indi
viduals who have passed an examination. Each of these nine vari
ables was used in an equation that tested the predictive effect of each
release files or opinions in small cases, I could not collect specific data on these cases. See
Leandra Lederman, Tax Court S Cases: Does the ‘S’ Stand for Secret?, 79 TAX NOTES 257
1998. Instead, I could only obtain aggregate data obtained from the IRS under the Freedom of
Information Act FOIA. See 5 USC § 552 1997. I could not obtain similar information under
FOIA from the Tax Court because FOIA applies only to administrative agencies, not courts. See
5 USC 552 a, 01 stating that section 552 applies to "agencies" as defined in section
5511 B; "the courts of the United States" are excluded from the definition of "agency".
°See I.R.C. § 7443A 1997 amended 1998.
See I.R.C. § 7443Ac; TAX CT. R. 183c.
72
Because files and opinions in small tax cases are not disclosed to the public during the
period in which I conducted this study, no small tax cases were included in this study. See
supra note 69.
‘
Because the PARTY and DECADE variables interacted, runs were done with an "in
teraction term" to control for the effect of the interaction. See Appendix F. The interaction was
not surprising, because DECADE reflects the decade in which a judge was appointed to the
bench and PARTY reflects the political party of the appointing President, a variable that
changes every four years at most. The interaction term proved not to be statistically significant,
and therefore not helpful, so further runs were done without that term.
See I.R.C. § 7482b 1997.
75See Golsen v. Commissioner, 54 T.C. 742 1970, aff’d on other grounds, 445 F.2d 985
10th Cir. 1971. If there is no precedent squarely on point in the circuit to which appeal would
lie, the Tax Court can apply its own rule. See id.
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on the outcome variable, TRIAL. That is, statistical analyses tested
whether, controlling for the other variables mentioned, a case with
higher stakes, for example, would have an increased likelihood of
going to trial.76
In. STUDY RESULTS AND IMPLICATIONS FOR CASE-SELECTION
MODELS

As shown in Appendix E, Analysis of the Tax Court data studied
revealed that five of the nine independent variables, APPEALS,
STAKES, JUDGETYPE, DECADE and BACKGROUND, were sta
tistically significant in predicting an increased likelihood that a case
would go to trial.77 Thus, the data demonstrated a nonrandom selec
tion of cases for trial: Tried cases were statistically different from
settled ones. The specific results are even more interesting in that
they provide insights into the mechanisms at work in Tax Court,
which in turn illuminates the applicability of the various theoretical
models to other kinds of cases.
A. The Study Results and Insights into the Models
Cases that had been through the Appeals Office prior to being
docketed in Tax Court were about four times more likely to go to
trial78 than cases that had not been to the Appeals Office prior to
docketing.79 This tends to indicate that the IRS’ internal dispute

76Specific
results of the analyses are reported in Appendix E.
‘
See Appendix E. The nonrandomness result agrees with Perloff and Rubinfeld. See
Perloff & Rubinfeld, supra note 9, at 166, 167 finding that certain variables were statistically
significant in predicting settlement in their data of private antitrust litigation. However, Perloff
and Rubinfeld’ $ data were from the data set on private antitrust litigation, where information on
settlements was gleaned from party surveys that was not necessarily reflective of the underlying
pool of cases used in the study. See supra note 43.
The APPEALS variable was the most statistically significant predictor of settlement in
the data set, with a p-value of .0000.
The results for the APPEALS variable are consistent with aggregate statistics on Tax
Court cases, which reflect that fewer of the Tax Court petitions arise out of notices of deficiency
sent by the Appeals Office than by notices sent by the Examination Division of the IRS or its
Service Centers. See U.S. TAX COURT JUDIcIAL CONF. 1997 showing that for fiscal year
1990, 3,702 dockets arose out of Appeals Office notices of deficiency, 12,250 arose out of those
sent by the Examination Division, 10,485 arose out of those sent by Service Centers, and 1,911
were unreported; numbers are similar for other years reported. 1991 through 1994.
The results discussed in this section are reported in the chart in Appendix E. That chart
provides a side-by-side comparison of five representative statistical runs. The APPEALS vari
able was not included in all runs because that reduced the usable sample size to approximately
342 cases. See infra note 180. However, it was used in the final model, Model 5 in Appendix E,
as well as many of the models used to anive at the final model. Runs on the set of 342 cases
were very consistent with runs on the larger pool. See Appendix E. For a description of the full
set of 479 cases and the subset of 342 cases, see Appendix D.
79Cases having been through the Appeals Office’s pre-docketing process without settling
were approximately four times as likely to go to trial as cases that had not been through the
Appeals Office’s pre-docketing process. See Appendix E, Models 4, 5 showing that cases that
did not go though a pre-docketing IRS appeal were .24 or .26 times as likely to go to trial as
cases that had been through a pre-docketing IRS appeal.
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resolution process is effective.80 That is, there were relatively few
cases that were settled during dealings with district counsel attorneys
in Tax Court that were capable of settlement but were prevented from
earlier settlement because of the dynamics in the Appeals Office.
This result is consistent with scholars’ reasoning that alternative dis
pute resolution might facilitate parties’ understanding of their cases,
and therefore reduce estimation errors,81 or help prevent lawyer-client
agency problems.82 It might also help prevent strategic behavior.
Although the strategic behavior model does not suggest the nonran
dom selection of a particular type of case for trial, scholars have theo
rized that familiarity with the opponent may reduce the possibility of
a bargaining breakdown.83 This is consistent with the theory that in
creased information about the other party’s risk preference and esti
mates of success and the amount of damages helps temper strategic
behavior.
The direction of the STAKES result-that higher stakes cases
were much more likely to go to trial-is quite informative, If risk
aversion increased with the stakes involved, this would suggest that
higher stakes cases settle disproportionately,84 a result which in fact
did not occur. On the other hand, optimism models and asymmetric
information models, both of which are models based on parties’ "di
vergent expectations" about trial outcomes, postulate that parties fail
Because some of the independent variables that eventually determine the trial or settle
ment outcome may also determine whether a taxpayer brought the case to the Appeals Office
prior to docketing it in Tax Court, the inclusion of APPEALS as an independent variable may
produce simultaneous equations bias. See Peter Kennedy, A GUIDE TO ECONOMETRICS 126-45
2d ed. 1985. The lack of suitable instrumental variables precluded the standard instrumental
variables approach as a treatment for this problem. See id. at 133. As an alternative, I ran an
equation similar to Model 1 in Appendix B, but with a dependent variable that allows four pos
sible outcomes: 1 pre-docketing appeal, settle in Tax Court; 2 pre-docketing appeal, Tax
Court trial; 3 no pre-docketing appeal, settle in Tax Court; and 4 no pre-docketing appeal,
Tax Court trial. This equation was estimated using a multinomial logistic procedure. See id. at
191. The results indicated no substantive differences from the results of the binomial logistic
regression, except that results for COUNSEL indicated that represented taxpayers were more
likely to have a pre-docketing appeal than unrepresented taxpayers.
80
However, taxpayers know that if they do not go to the Appeals Office prior to filing iii
a Tax Court, the case will be sent there afterwards. See Rev. Proc. 87-24, 1987-1 C.B. 720. It is
possible that some taxpayers wait to settle their cases until they are in the Appeals Office.
81
"Although particular methods of alternative dispute resolution ... vary from one an
other, they share the feature that a third party is involved who offers an opinion or communi
cates information about the dispute to the disputants." Shavell, supra note 8, at I.
82 See
id. at 21 "It is sometimes suggested as well that ADR might furnish clients a
unique chance to understand the character of their cases and thereby help to defeat client-lawyer
agency problems. Whatever is the truth of the matter, it warrants investigation.". See infra
notes 116-33 and accompanying text for a discussion of lawyer-client agency problems.
See Stephen McG. Bundy, The Policy in Favor of Settlement in an Adversary System,
44 HASTINGS L.J. 1, 15 1992; Robert Cooter et. al., Bargaining in the Shadow of the Law. A
Testable Model of Strategic Behavior, lii. LEGAL STUD. 225, 232-33, 241 1982; cf Gross &
Syverud, Getting to No, supra note 12, at 327 noting that data did not bear out the hypothesis
that repeat players were tougher bargainers; defendant insurance companies were not more
intransent bargainers than plaintiffs.
Cf. Perloff & Rubinfeld, supra note 9, at 160 "[R]isk-averse parties are more likely to
settle a given case than risk-neutral parties. If risk aversion increases with the magnitude of the
losses involved, a reduction in the damages multiplier will reduce the amount of risk and there
fore, other things equal, increase the likelihood that the case will go to trial.".
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to settle when their estimates of the expected outcome at trial differ to
such an extent as to preclude a settlement range,85 that is, a difference
of greater than or equal to the sum of the parties’ litigation costs.86
Divergent expectations theories suggest that cases with higher stakes
may be more difficult to settle assuming litigation costs remain
fixed because the same difference in opinion translates into a larger
difference in the expected outcome of the case.87 The results for
STAKES supports divergent expectations theory and the importance
of estimation errors to the settlementitrial decision. The results may
reflect that litigation costs do not rise proportionately to the stakes, 8
thus magnifying the effects of estimation differences at higher stakes
levels.89
Theoretically, higher stakes could indicate a case with higher
precedential value, although it is unlikely that the two characteristics
are perfectly correlated. However, in general, taxpayers dispropor
tionately win higher stakes cases, thus suggesting that the "repeat
player" version of the external effects model is not being played out
in Tax Court. In fact, the value of a Tax Court precedent to the IRS is

85

See Shavell, supra note 8, at 11 "If the defendant believes the plaintiffs chances of

winning are less than 40 percent, there will not be room for settlement since then the defendant
will pay less than $4,000 + $2,000 = $6,000 in settlement, which is the least the plaintiff would

accept.". In other words, "[w]hen estimation errors are nonzero, the disputes that go to trial
tend to be disputes in which the two sides’ estimates are relatively far apart." Thomas, supra
note 43, at 222; see also Priest and Klein, supra note 1, at 16 stating that where difference
between parties’ probability estimates of outcome is small, they are more likely to settle than
where difference is large.
Using the numbers in the example discussed above, see supra text accompanying note
16, assume, as above, that if the suit goes to trial, the plaintiff will receive $10,000 if he wins,
and that he estimates a 70% probability of winning. Assume trial costs to plaintiff and defen
dant of $1,000 and $2,000, respectively. Based on the plaintiff’s estimate of a 70% chance of
receiving $10,000, and the $1,000 cost to go to trial, he will settle for anything above $6,000.
However, if, unlike the above example, the defendant estimates that the plaintiff has only a 30%
likelihood of winning $10,000, the defendant would not be willing to settle the case for more
than $5,000 the sum of his estimate of the expected outcome, $3,000 and his expected litigation
costs, $2,000. Thus, divergent estimations of the expected value of the case eliminated a set
tlement range in this example.
86
See Trubek, supra note 2, at 76 n.9 citing John P. Gould, The Economics of Legal
Conflicts, 2 J. LEGAL STUD. 279, 285-88 1973; see also Steven Shavell, Suit, Settlement, and
Trial: A Theoretical Analysis UnderAlternative Methods for the Allocation of Legal Costs, 11 J.
LEGAL STUD. 55, 63 1972 providing a numerical example of the absence of a settlement
range resulting from divergent expectations of the likely trial outcome.
See Shavell, supra note 8, at 14. However, if one or both parties were risk-averse,
cases with higher stakes might be more likely to settle. The government, a repeat player that
does not bear its own costs, may be risk-neutral. However taxpayers, choosing between
"losses" may be risk-averse. See Jeffrey Rachlinski, Gains, Losses, and the Psychology of Liti
gation, 70 S. CAL. L. REv. 113 1996.
Litigation costs might not rise proportionately to the stakes because the largest cost,
attorneys fees, may not rise proportionately with stakes because in Tax Court cases attorneys are
paid by the hour not on a contingency basis. Cf Claudio Riedi, Comment, To Shift or to Shaft:
Attorney Fees for Prevailing Claimants in Civil Forfeiture Suits, 47 U. MIAMI L. REv. 147, 181
n.l60 1992 "Litigation costs do not usually increase proportionally to the increase in the
stakes.".
In other words, as discussed above, the parties might be able to reach agreement in a
$3,000 settlement range where the stakes were $10,000 but not reach agreement in the same
settlement range if the stakes were $100,000 or $1,000,000.
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not particularly significant because of the fact that the Tax Court fol
lows any circuit precedent squarely on point. 90
The importance of several of the judge variables supports the lit
erature on the importance of judges to the conduct of litigation.91
Scholars have recognized that judges have a strong influence over the
way litigation is conducted.92 Theoretically, a judge might determine
not only the actual outcome of a case,93 but also might influence
whether a case settles or when it settles.94 "Advocates of judicial
participation in settlements insist this involvement ultimately saves
court time by disposing of cases that would otherwise go to trial."95
Even during the time that judges did not e,gage in active case man
agement, most cases settled without trial, but, if one current hy
pothesis is true, the trend in favor of "activist" or "managerial"
judges97 might indicate that more recently appointed judges settle a
greater percentage of their cases.
If more recently appointed judges are more likely to be "activ
ist,"98 the importance of the DECADE variable, the decade the judge
was appointed to the bench, lends support to the hypothesis that ac
supra note 75.
See, e.g., Peter H. Schuck, The Role of Judges in Settling Complex Cases: The Agent
Orange Example, 53 U. CHL L. REv. 337 1986.
92
See, e.g., Alexander, supra note 2, at 566; Resnick, supra note 2, at 376-77 "Many
federal judges have departed from their. . . relatively disinterested pose to adopt a more active,
‘managerial’ stance. In growing numbers, judges are not only adjudicating the merits of issues
presented to them by litigants, but also are meeting with parties in chambers to encourage set
tlement of disputes and to supervise case preparation. Both before and after the trial, judges are
p1ayin a critical role in shaping litigation and influencing results.".
Political science research indicates that judges make decisions in furtherance of their
ideologies. See, e.g., Robert A. DahI, Decision-Making in a Democracy: The Supreme Court as
a National Policy-Maker, 6 J. PUB. L. 279 1957; Tracey E. George & Lee Epstein, On the
Nature of Supreme Court Decisionmaking, 86 AM. POL. ScL REv. 323 1992; Jeffrey A. Segal
& Albert D. Cover, Ideological Values and the Votes of U.S. Supreme Court Justices, 83 AM.
POL. Sci. REv. 557 1989.
See Marc Galanter, Reading the Landscape of Disputes: What We Know and Don’t
Know and Think We Know About Our Allegedly Contentious and Litigious Society, UCLA L.
REv. 4, 8-9 1983 stating that those courts that were most intensely involved in settlement
were the slowest courts; Carrie Menkel-Meadow, For and Against Settlement: Uses and Abuses
of the Mandatory Settlement Conference, 33 UCLA L. REv. 485, 494 1985.
The mean time to decision in the subset of 342 cases was 744 days from filing of the pa
tition. The shortest time in that sample was 15 days, and the largest was 4249 days. I collected
time information but did not use it as an independent variable for this study because it is more
likely that the type of decision opinion or settlement indicates the relative length of time to
decision than the reverse. That is, cases that go to trial are likely to reflect a longer time to
disposition not because the time factor itself indicates an increased likelihood that a case will be
tried, but rather that it takes longer for a case to go to trial than for a case to settle prior to trial.
However, the time data could be useful in examining whether attorneys delay or accelerate
disposition of a case.
William L. Adams, Comment, Let’s Make a Deal: Effective Utilization of Judicial Set
tlements in State and Federal Courts, 72 OR. L. REv. 427, 427 1993 citing HUBERT L. WILL
ET AL., THE ROLE OF THE JUDGE N THE SETrLEMENT PROCESS 1977.
96See Charles E. Clark & James Wm. Moore, A New Federal Civil Procedure: Pleadings
and Parties, 44 YALE Li. 1291, 1294 n.8 1935 stating that a study showed that approxi
mately 70% of all civil cases filed in federal court did not reach a judge or jury decision.
For a discussion of "managerial judges," see Resnick, supra note 2, at 386-414. See
also Clermont & Eisenberg, supra note 37.
98
Anecdotal evidence suggests that some of the more recently appointed Tax Court
judges are particularly activist in encouraging parties to settle.
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tivist judges facilitate settlements. As a group, judges and Special
Trial Judges appointed in the 1980s were significantly less likely to
have a case go to trial than judges appointed in the 1960s or 1970s?9
Results for judges appointed in the 1990s, for which there was much
less data, were not statistically significant,’°° although they too were
less likely than udges appointed in the 1960s and l970s to have a
case go to trial.’ 1
BACKGROUND also supports the importance of judicial char
acteristics on whether a case settles or goes to trial, Cases before
judges with a government background were more likely to go to trial
than those with a private sector background. That is, judges from pri
vate practice may be more "activist" in promoting settlement. How
ever, cases before judges with experience in both government and the
private sector were less likely to go to trial than cases before judges
with a private sector background. This may indicate that the parties’
estimations of trial outcomes were more likely to overlap where the
judge had both types of experience before appointment to the
bench!°2 It is also possible that judges whose prior experience en
abled them to "see both sides" pushed harder for settlement or that
their efforts to facilitate settlement were taken more seriously because
the judge had credibility with both parties.
The fact that cases before Special Trial Judges were significantly
more likely to go to trial than cases before regular judges might re
flect the fact that parties have less information from which to form
estimates of trial outcomes in cases before Special Trial Judges be
cause many opinions authored by Special Trial Judges are unpub
lished "Sum.mary Opinions" in small tax cases,’°3 Thus, increased
information about the judge’s decision-making would increase the
likelihood of settlement.10’1 In addition, the data may reflect that par
ties accord less weight to settlement pressure from Special Trial
Judges as they do to regular judges. If true, this would support the
The reference group was the 1960s to l970s. For example, in the run with 342 cases,
including the APPEALS variable but not PARTY, judges and Special Trial Judges appointed in
the 1980s were .354 times as likely as the reference group to have a case result in an opinion
decision.
‘ The 95% confidence interval included 1, so it is possible that there was no increased
or decreased likelihood of trial in cases before judges appointed in the 1990s and the reference
group of judges appointed in the 1960s-1970s. See infra note 176 and accompanying text cx
plainin confidence intervals that include 1.
‘Judges appointed in the 1990s were .594 times as likely as the reference group to have
cases result in an opinion decision, but that result was not statistically significant; the 95% con
fidence interval included 1, which means that the relationship could have occurred by chance.
See infra note 176 and accompanying text.
‘° It is also possible that this result simply reflects the fact that the groups are made up of
relatively few judges so that, since judge effects are important, the p-value is low, but the log
odds number reflects a blending of characteristics other than the judge’s work background.
supra note 72 and accompanying text.
‘See
104
It is also possible that thaI costs are lower in cases heard by Special Trial Judges than
by regular judges. This is unlikely, however, because none of the cases in the sample were
small tax cases.
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importance ofjudicial activism in promoting settlements. However, it
is possible that this result reflects either a nonrandom assignment of
cases to Special Trial Judges as a gØpO5 or the fact that cases settled
before a judge is assigned are entered as stipulated decisions by the
Chief Judge, which overstates the number of cases settled by regular
judges.’°6
Overall, the importance of the judge variables indicates that
judges affect which cases settle.’°7 Activist judges may assist the
parties or their attorneys in overcoming some barriers to settlement. 108
It is possible, for example, that activist judges give parties more in
formation about the likely outcome at trial,’09 or discourage "opti
which reduces parties’ estimation errors, or helps ?arties
avoid strategic behavior1’ or lawyer-client agency problems. 12
fact, some Tax Court judges telephone parties ?rior to trial and ask
them about the nature of settlement discussions,’ schedule a pre-trial

105
For example, repeat players among taxpayers would have an incentive not to elect the
small tax case procedure for stronger cases, in order to end up with a published precedent, and
to elect the procedure for weaker cases. Even for larger cases, repeat players could, at least in
theory, request assignment of the case to a Special Trial Judge. However, if this phenomenon
occurred, the results that a greater percentage of cases before Special Trial Judges go to trial
than cases before regular judges suggests that cases disfavoring repeat players were dispropor
tionately tried, contrary to the predictions of the external effects model. It also suggests that the
party with private information about the strength of the case-the repeat player-was not set
tling weaker cases, which is consistent with the asymmetric information model but not the
Priest/Klein model.
106
Cases are assigned to trial calendars as soon as possible after joinder of issue. See
TAx CT. R. 131. In deficiency cases, issue is generally joined once the IRS has filed its answer,
unless a reply is required. See TAX CT. R. 38. It is possible that the number of cases settled by
regular judges is overstated in my data set because cases that settled before they were assigned
to a particular judge’s thal calendar were apparently entered by the Chief Judge by definition a
regular judge as stipulated decisions. However, many of those cases in the data set that settled
so early were missing information on many variables, and were therefore not included in most
of the regressions. Unfortunately, my data did not allow me to distinguish between those cases
on the Chief Judge’s trial calendar that settled and those that settled before they were assigned
to a particular
calendar.
11
The PARTY variable was not statistically significant, which is consistent with the re
sults of another study. See Ashenfelter et. al., supra note 3, at 281.
108
However, a study of federal district court cases found only minor judge effects on
whether a case settles. See id. at 272. In that study, cases before judges appointed by Republi
can Presidents were more likely to have settled than cases before judges appointed by Demo
cratic Presidents, but the results were not statistically significant. See id. at 276-77. In addition,
increased settlements could be the result of judges’ bias toward settlement, which would not
involve countering party pessimism or lawyers’ irrational fear of trial, for example. See Bundy,
supra note 83, at 70.
See Shavell supra note 8, at 21.
110
See Bundy, supra note 83, at70 "[L]eading settlement judges frequently discuss both
the need to ‘throw cold water’ on the parties to reduce unwarranted optimism and the measures
designed to achieve that purpose
citations omitted.
A "facilitator" judge sthves to prevent strategic breakdowns in bargaining and encour
age settlement where there is a settlement range. See id. at 60-61; see also infra notes 113-15,
providing examples of how a Tax Court judge may facilitate settlement.
112
A "counselor" judge may review each party’s factual and legal claims with the party
and his lawyer in order to expose its weaknesses. This may help control lawyer-client conflicts
of interest that would otherwise hinder settlement. See Bundy, supra note 83, at 63-64.
"
See Smith, supra note 16, at 80 "It is quite common that a judge will speak to the
parties on a conference telephone call prior to the thai and question them about settlement dis
cussions, and even as to the nature of the parties’ settlement positions.".

338

CASE WESTERN RESERVE LAWRE ViEW

[Vol.

49:315

conference to discuss settlement"4 or even solicit settlement offers
from the parties and ascertain if there is a settlement range."5
Unlike the foregoing judge variables, the COUNSEL variable
was not statistically significant’6 Its lack of importance as a trial
predictor tends to undermine various theories about the effects of at
torneys on litigation, unless counsel influence different cases in oppo
site and offsetting ways."7 On the one hand, scholars suggest that
consulting an attorney may improve a party’s estimation of the trial
outcome, and may mitigate some of the self-serving estimation bias
that underlies the theory of the optimism model’8 However, clients
might sometimes ignore an attorney’s recommendation to settle be
cause of uncertainty about the attorney’s ability to estimate the likely
trial outcome."9 Moreover, although the standard economic models
discussed above ignore the presence of attorneys20 the presence of
attorneys imposes principal-aent problems on the basic economic
model of dispute resolution.’2 Some researchers argue that because
attorneys’ interests might at times diverge from their clients’ inter
ests,’22 attorneys’ economic incentives might influence which cases
"4
See id. "if the parties are reluctant to discuss their case on the telephone, or if the
judge feels an in-person discussion would be more productive, the judge may schedule a pretrial
conference under Rule 110, or a meeting between the parties in chambers. . . . Probably the most
common meeting in chambers, however, occurs after the calendar call on the first day of a trial
session in a city outside Washington. Usually, if either party requests a chambers conference, or
if the judge thinks one would be helpthl, the parties privately sit down with the judge and they
mutually explore settlement. In the typical chambers conference, the judge first will ask each
party to explain its case and how it expects to prove that case. After both sides have spoken, the
judge may try to focus them on mutual areas of agreement or suggest a procedure for coming to
agreement. The judge also may ask the parties if they would be interested in hearing the judge’s
tentative views on how he or she would rule in the case, assuming the parties presented the
evidence they said they would present.".
115
See Id. "A less common form of mediation that the judges employ in chambers con
ferences is to ask the parties if they would be willing to inform the judge of their settlement
ranges without the other party being present. After the parties jointly discuss the case with the
judge, the judge will speak to the parties separately often with a law clerk present as a witness
to learn their settlement ranges. If the judge sees an overlap in those ranges, he may call the
parties back into the room jointly and tell the parties that an overlap exists and even suggest a
settlement number that both parties could live with.".
‘16The COUNSEL variable reflects whether the taxpayer was represented in Tax Court at
any time. In collecting the data, if the CCH Tar Court Petitions Digest, the actual petition, if it
was available, or, for trials, the opinion itself, reflected the presence of an attorney or other
representative, that was noted. If it was known that the taxpayer was not represented during the
entire pendency of the case, that was also noted, but the taxpayer was treated as represented for
purposes
of the COUNSEL variable.
"7
See infra notes 118-33 and accompanying text.
It is unlikely to completely eliminate the effects of party optimism, however. See
Bundy, supra note 83, at 19; Elizabeth F. Loftus & Willem A. Wagenaar, Lawyers’ Predictions
of Success, 28 JURIMETRICS J. 437 1988.
1,9 See Thomas,
supra note 43, at 225 "Clients sometimes force trials by refusing to ac
cept attorneys’ recommendations to settle. In such disputes. the attorney’s estimation error is
exacerbated by a client’s uncertainty about the attorney’s evaluation of the dispute’s probability
of success.".
tn See Oilson
& Mnookin, supra note 21.
121
See Cooter & Rubinfeld, supra note 5, at 1070.
122
See, e.g., Bundy, supra note 83, at 19, 19 n.76 arguing that lawyers’ interests may di
verge from clients’ for such reasons as "fee arrangements, personal identification with or revul
sion for the client or her cause, obligations to other clients, desire to curry favor with prospec
tive clients, or concern for reputation, whether with other lawyers, the tribunal, or the wider
public"; Frank B. Cross, The Role of Lawyers in Positive Theories of Doctrinal Evolution, 45
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settle.’23 First, attorneys paid by the hour may have an incentive to
continue to litigate a case that could be settled, postponing or even
precluding settlement.’24 On the other hand, contingency-fee attorneys
might have an economic incentive to settle cases early,’25 even when
that is not in the client’s best interest.126 However, these effects might
indicate only when a case will settle, not whether it will settle. Ex
isting research indicates that those lawyers who practice on a contin
gency fee basis are more likely to settle cases than those paid by the
hour,127 but those effects are generally found to be marginal in data
sets of actual cases.128 In Tax Court cases, attorneys typically charge
by the hour, rather than on a contingency basis, probably because
functionally the taxpayer is defending129 against a tax liability as
serted by the IRS’3°

U. 523, 544-46 1996; Gross & Syverud, Getting to No, supra note 12, at 349-52;
Geoffrey P. Miller, Some Agency Problems in Settlement, 16 J. LEGAL STUD. 189, 201 1987;
Angela Wennihan, Let’s Put the Contingency Back in the Contingency Fee, 49 SMU L. REV.
1639, 16511996 "An attorney’s interests are generally aligned with the client’s because the
common goal is to extract a large settlement or verdict from the defendant. The interests di
verge, however, because the attorney maximizes her net profit by working as few hours as pos
sible to reach this large result, whereas the client wants the attorney to work as many hours as
necessary to attain this goal.". But cf. Trubek et. al., supra note 2, at 108 demonstrating that
hourly fee lawyers and contingency fee lawyers did not spend statistically different amounts of
time on cases, even when comparing hours per event or hours per dollar at stake.
‘ See, e.g., Gertner, supra note 3, at 79 postulating that explanations for failure to settle
might include attorneys advising clients to make low settlement offers or reject settlement offers
if the attorney can make more money by litigating.
‘ See, e.g., Gilson & Mnookin, supra note 21, at 513, 527-29; Miller, supra note 14, at
189-90; Cross, supra note 122, at 556 quoting Robert H. Gertner & Geoffrey P. Miller, Settle
ment Escrows, 24 J. LEGAL STUD. 87,98 1995; Rachlinski, supra note 87, at 172 stating that
avaricious hourly-fee lawyers could discourage settlement by framing the settlement offer as a
loss; cf Lisa Bernstein, Understanding the Limits of Court-Connected ADR: A Critique of
Federal Court-Annexed Arbitration Programs, 141 U. PA. L. REV. 2169, 2195 1993 "A law
yer paid on an hourly basis has a strong incentive to encourage his client to request a trial [after
mandatory non-binding ADRI since most legal fees are earned during discovery and trial.".
See, e.g., Gilson & Mnookin, supra note 21, at 513, 527-29; Miller, supra note 14, at
189-90.
‘ See Wennihan, supra note 122, at 1655 "The lawyer and the client have the same in
terests only when the case goes to the jury; before that time the attorney actually has a strong
incentive to settle the case, which could be in conflict with the plaintiffs best interests." cita
tion omitted.
See Terry Thomason, Are Attorneys Paid What They’re Worth? Contingent Fees and
the Settlement Process, 20 J. LEGAL STUD. 187, 189-90, 215-22 1991; cf Bernstein, supra
note 124, at 2195 arguing that where the client has a right to a trial de novo, "a contingency-fee
lawyer has a strong incentive to encourage his client to accept an arbitration award".
‘
See, e.g., Bundy, supra note 83, at 20 stating empirical evidence on whether hourly
fee and contingency fee lawyers yield to incentives to follow their own interests is ambiguous
citing Herbert M. Kritzer et. al., The Impact of Fee Arrangement on Lawyer Effort, 19 L. &
SOc’Y REV. 251 1985; Gross & Syverud, Don’t Try, supra note 12, at 54 "We do not doubt
that plaintiffs’ attorneys . . . sometimes act in conflict with the best interests of the parties. But
we do not believe that such conflicts strategic or otherwise are a common cause of trials .
[In their survey of attorneys,] no defense attorney said that there was no settlement because the
plaintiffs attorney wanted a shot at a major verdict
; see also Kessler et. al., supra note 37,
at 248 çstating agency effects on the decision to litigate or settle are theoretically indeterminate.
See Lederman, supra note 53, at 193-94. Technically, however, the taxpayer is the
plaintiff. See id.
130
That is, even if the taxpayer wins the case entirely, he will generally not collect any
thing, but rather will be relieved of a liability to the IRS. This is true unless the Tax Court finds
that the taxpayer made an overpayment of tax, which occasionally happens. See I.R.C.
§ 651 2bl 1997 granting Tax Court jurisdiction over overpayments.
EMORY
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On the other hand, attorneys may be able to mitigate strategic
behavior that might prevent settlement.’31 That is, it is possible that
attorneys enable clients to settle cases their clients could not settle on
their own,’32 perhaps because of reputational concerns as repeat play
ers that clients may not have.133
The lack of significance of the REGION variable indicates that
anecdotal evidence that some district counsels’ offices are more will
ing to settle cases than others might be unfounded. In addition, al
though individual taxpayers were slightly more litigious than corpo
rate taxpayers, the results for the TAXPAYER variable were not sta
tistically significant. This tends to indicate that risk-aversion by indi
viduals was not a strong indicator of the settlements that did occur.’34
It also suggests that individuals in the sample were not disproportion
ately litigious.’35

131 In addition, some commentators have argued that pro se litigants file frivolous cases,
or use legal process to harass others. See, e.g., Jeffrey M. McLaughlin, Note, An Extension of
the Right of Access: The Pro Se Litigant’s Right to Notfication of the Requirements of the
Summary Judgment Rule, 55 FORDHAM L. REv. 1109, 1109 n. 4 1987 listing cases in which
pro se litigants used litigation to harass others; Eric J.R. Nichols, Note, Preserving Pro Se
Representation in an Age of Rule 11 Sanctions, 67 Thx. L. REV. 351, 351 n.3 1988 listing
further cases in which pro Se litigation was used to harass others.
Commentators also assert that, where only one side is represented, pro se litigants are
substantively disadvantaged, at least in small claims court. See, e.g., Thomas L. Eovaldi &
Peter R. Meyers, The Pro Se Small Claims Court in Chicago: Justice for the ‘Little Guy’?, 72
NW. U. L. REV. 947, 987 tbl. VIII 1978 finding that where defendant was represented, plain
tiff won 68.8% of cases; where defendant was not, plaintiff won 85.4% of cases; Barbara
Yngvesson & Patricia Hennessy, Small Claims, Complex Disputes: A Review of the Small
Claims Literature, 9 L. & Soc’y REv. 219, 250 1975 relating findings of unreported study;
Mark S. Downing et al., Note, The Toledo Small Claims Court: Part!, 6 U. TOL L. REV. 397,
405-06 1975; Hon. Tim Murphy, D.C. Small Claims Court-The Forgotten Court, 34 D.C.BJ.
at 14, 15-16 Feb. 1967; see also Richard N. Block & Jack Stieber, The Impact of Attorneys
and Arbitrators on Arbitration Awards, 40 INDUS. & LABOR REL. REv. 543, 553-54 1987
describing how arbitration parties fared better with attorneys in discharge cases than without,
particularly if the other side did not have an attorney; where neither side had an attorney, awards
did not differ significantly from cases in which both had an attorney. Where each side has the
option of hiring an attorney, the decision whether to do so might be viewed as a "prisoner’s
dilemma." However, in Tax Court, the IRS is always represented; only the taxpayer may be
either represented or pro Se.
See Eovaldi & Meyers, supra note 131, at 988 showing that in the small claims court
cases they studied, an appearance had been filed by an attorney in 26.2% of cases, but in cases
settled on the day of trial, an attorney was present in 36.3% of the cases; Gilson & Mnookin,
supra note 21, at 512; see also Kessler et al., supra note 37, at 246 arguing that contingency fee
lawyers have an economic incentive to settle early on; cf Rachlinski, supra note 87, at 171,
172 noting that lawyers might frame settlement offers as "gains" rather than "losses," thus
encouraging the client to settle, or they might do the opposite; Trubek et aL, supra note 2, at
104-05 stating that lawyers’ pursuit of their own goals increases litigation costs; id. at 105
noting that the study showed that client control of lawyers did not affect hourly or contingency
fee lawXers’ time investment in a case.
Interestingly, in a study where attorneys were asked why cases that went to trial failed
to settle, "[a] clear pattern emerged immediately: Each side says the other one did it." Gross &
Syverud, Don’t Try, supra note 12, at 49.
Common wisdom suggests that individuals are more risk-averse than corporations, as
suming they bear their own costs. See, e.g., Gross & Syverud, Getting to No, supra note 12, at
381.
133
Cf Galanter, supra note 94, at 5-11 discussing perception of our society as one of the
most litigious in the world. Eisenberg and Farber looked at whether the type of legal entity
involved in the litigation affected the plaintiff" s win rate. Whether the taxpayer is an individual,
corporation or some other entity theoretically could affect the likelihood of settlement. See
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In sum, the results tend to support the importance of information
in parties’ formation of expectations about the likely outcome at trial.
The STAKES variable supports the importance of divergent expecta
tions as possible causes of trials. The judge variables also suggest the
importance of judge behavior in minimizing divergent expectations
and strategic behavior. The APPEALS variable results also suggest
that the parties settle early in cases in which they have similar expec
tations about the outcome. The lack of significance of the TAX
PAYER and COUNSEL variables tends to indicate that risk prefer
ence and attorney-client agency problems are not significant causes of
Tax Court trials.
B. Generalizability of the Results to Other Civil Litigation
The study results, while demonstrating a nonrandom selection of
cases for trial in Tax Court, raise the issue of the generalizability of
the results. In most respects, Tax Court cases are similar to other civil
cases. Despite the similarities, pecific trial predictors may be differ
ent in other types of litigation.13 In addition, Tax Court cases do dif
fer from other cases in some ways. First, Tax Court cases are care
fully selected from the underlying pooi of tax disputes. Three fora
have trial-level jurisdiction over federal civil tax cases: the Tax Court,
the district courts, and the United States Court of Federal Claims.137
Although the tax jurisdiction of each is not entirely co-terminous,
many litigated tax cases could be considered by an1 of the three fora;
the Tax Court hears 95% of these cases, however,’ 8 which minimizes
this selection effect. Tax Court cases may also be heard in the court’s
small tax case division,139 and of course many tax cases never make it
to court because they are resolved by the IRS Appeals Office before
they are ever docketed.14° Thus, in interpreting the results of this
study, the fact that Tax Court cases are probably not a random subset
of all tax disputes must be considered. However, the study did con
trol for size of the amount at stake, and whether the case had a pre
docketing IRS appeal. In addition, the fact that there are trial predic
tors even within a relatively homogenous and selected group of cases
suggests that selection effects would be magnified if one were able to
compare Tax Court cases with those that dropped out along the way
to Tax Court.’41
Theodore Eisenberg & Henry S. Farber, The Litigious Plaintiff Hypothesis: Case Selection and
Resolution, 28 RAND J. ECON. S92, S93 1997.
To use one example, certain variables selected for this study are court-specific, such as
JUDGETYPE
regular judge or Special Trial Judge.
‘‘
See supra note 53.
138
See Lederman, supra note 53, at 185.
‘39See supra note 68 and accompanying text.
‘40See supra notes 60-62 and accompanying text.
14!
In addition, regressions using interaction terms for APPEALS by STAKES, AP
PEALS by COUNSEL and APPEALS by JUDGETYPE did not generate p-values even close to
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Furthermore, unlike much other civil litigation, Tax Court dis
putes involve an administrative agency ofthe federal government, the
IRS, as well as a private party, the taxpayer. This feature distin
guishes Tax Court cases from other litigation in several ways. First,
one side to each dispute is a repeat player, whereas the other party is
unlikely to be a repeat player. The repeat player, the IRS, is likely to
be risk-neutral,’42 while taxpayers may vary in risk preference. Riskneutrality by one party results in a narrower settlement range, all
other things being equal, than if that party were risk-averse.’43 In ad
dition, a repeat player has greater stakes in the litigation," which
may affect the selection of cases for trial,’ That is, the repeat player
may include the potential precedential value of an opinion decision in
its calculus of whether to settle, while a one-shot player typically
would not.’46
In addition to being a repeat player, the IRS is an administrative
agency charged with applying a federal statute. There is currently no
formal model that predicts how government litigation, as opposed to
other repeat-player litigation, may affect the selection of cases for
trial, but there may be differences.
The IRS may not internalize the
the
cost of litigation
way the taxpayer does, since the government
does not bear its own costs,’48 which could lead to distortions in ap
plication of the economic analysis of whether to settle or go to trial.
Furthermore, the government may be more successful at trial than
‘

significance at the .05 level. This tends to indicate that cases considered by the Appeals Office
prior to docketing in Tax Court are statistically similar to those not so considered during pre
docketing, with respect to STAKES, COUNSEL and JUDGETYPE, so that selection at the
Appeals Office level did not affect the study’s results.
142
Repeat players are likely to be risk-neutral because, over a number of iterations, their
actual trial results will approximate the expected trial results of cases in the pool.
See supra note 16.
See Feirstein, supra note 15, at 207 "[T]he [Internal Revenue] Service may gain the
value of precedent by proceeding to trial. In addition, the Service’s litigation costs are generally
fixed and therefore less significant than the taxpayer’s litigation costs. To determine the value of
precedent, the Service multiplies the probability of a favorable precedent by the aggregate
amount of deficiencies outstanding, and subtracts from that sum its litigation costs. The Service
must then net this against the anticipated loss in revenues attendant to an adverse judgment. If
the probability of a favorable judgment outweighs the particular tax liability at issue, resulting in
a cost to settling before trial, the Service will attempt to force a trial rather than settle." foot
notes omitted.
145
See generally Priest & Klein, supra note I examining the relationship between liti
gated and settled cases.
‘See
supra note 19 and accompanying text; supra note 35 and accompanying text.
247
Perloff and Rubinfeld noted that in their data of private antitrust litigation, without
controlling for other differences among plaintiffs, plaintiffs that were organizations such as
unions or governmental agencies settled many fewer cases than plaintiffs that were firms, al
though the difference was not statistically significant. In addition, their data revealed little
difference in settlement rates among types of defendants. See Perloff & Rubinfeld, supra note 9,
at 163, 182 n.26 showing in a table that there is little variation in settlement rates by type of
defendant.
In addition, the IRS’ litigation costs may be relatively fixed, regardless of whether or
not it brings a specific case to trial. See Feirstein, supra note 15, at 207 explaining that because
the IRS’ costs of litigation are fixed, they are less significant than the taxpayer’s costs.
‘44Butcfid.
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private parties,’5° and an administrative agency may tend to win a
disproportionate amount of small-stakes cases while losing a dispro
portionate amount of large-stakes cases.’5’
Nonetheless, the fact that the study’s results, which found appli
cable to Tax Court cases models developed in the context of general
civil litigation bodes well for the generalizability of the nonrandom
ness result. Of course, the specific variables that are trial predictors
in Tax Court cases are not necessarily predictors in other types of
cases and the presence of the IRS on one side of the litigation may
alter the results of specific variables that are predictors in other types
of litigation. However, the general findings of my study that cases
are nonrandomly selected for trial, and that there are certain identifi
able trial "predictors," are likely generalizable to other types of civil
litigation and are informative for future studies of this type.
CONCLUSION
This study of recent Tax Court cases directly supports the hy
pothesis that cases are not randomly selected for trial; tried cases in
the sample were statistically different from settled ones. The study
also demonstrates that it is possible to use actual cases to test theories
about which cases settle, without having the results corrupted by the
restrictive assumptions of economic models. In addition, the data
demonstrate that there are identifiable trial predictors in actual cases.
The specific trial predictors in Tax Court cases are useful in un
derstanding the theoretical models of suit and settlement. They show
the importance of differences in the parties’ estimations of the likely
outcome at trial, the importance of information and the influence the
judge can have on party estimates and strategic behavior. The results
also show the importance of administrative dispute resolution in the
settlement process. Although the specific results of this study are not
necessarily generalizable outside of Tax Court, the insights into the
applicability of the leading theories on suit and settlement should be.
° See Eisenberg, supra note 1, at 1600 showing that the United States government fared
much better at trial than other employment claim plaintiffs and modestly better at trial than other
defendants. However, this result could be attributable to repeat-player effects as hypothesized
by the external
effects model of case selection. See supra note 35 and accompanying text.
251
Judge Posner demonstrates that where an agency brings mostly small cases, this may
reflect a proper allocation of the agency’s resources. See Posner, supra note 60, at 311-15. In
Tax Court, the IRS recovers a much higher percentage of the amount at stake in small cases than
in large cases. See Guttman, supra note 60 at 155 "According to IRS statistics, in the first 11
months of fiscal 1993, the IRS recovered about 17 cents on the dollar in cases with over $10
million at issue. Of the 87 cases settled without trial, it got 12 cents on the dollar. At the same
time, of the 30,263 cases settled with under $10 million at issue, the IRS got about 42 cents on
the dollar.". The overwhelming majority of Tax Court cases are smaller-stakes cases. See id.
at 156 "Docketed cases with over $10 million at issue represent a mere handful of the cases the
IRS litigates. For example, in June 1993, the overall Tax Court inventory contained 41,631
cases. About 300 of these were in the over-$10 million category. These 300 or so cases, how
ever, represented almost $25 billion of the nearly $38 billion in dispute in docketed cases.".
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In addition, this study raises interesting questions for future research,
such as whether variables that did not influence whether cases settle,
such as the presence or absence of counsel, nonetheless influence
when cases settle.’52

152

Because my data set contains information on the number of days that elapsed between
the filing of the Tax Court petition and the entry of decision in the case, it will be possible to
examine whether, for example, attorneys delay settlements.
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Appendix A: Data Collection Techniques
The data for this study were primarily collected in the summer of
For opinion decisions, I used only cases closed within the prior
five years, because of the Tax Court’s policy of removing to a ware
house cases closed for more than five years.
Because tens of thou
sands of cases are filed in Tax Court each year,154 too many for this
study, I collected data on a random sample of these cases. Because
only approximately five percent of Tax Court petitions result in a
trial, a completely random sampling would likely have resulted in
very few tried cases. In order to make meaningful comparisons be
tween tried cases opinion decisions and settled cases stipulated de
cisions, I over-sampled opinion decisions, selecting an approxi
matel equal number of dockets of opinion and stipulated deci
sions.
A random number generator was used to select a random
subset of all opinion decisions from Lexis printouts of all Tax Court
opinion decisions from 1990 to 1995. A stratified sampling was done
so that a portion was selected from each year, with the fewest selected
from 1995 because it was an incomplete year at the time of the sam
pling. This resulted in 47 opinions decided in 1990, 46 from 1991, 51
from 1992, 45 from 1993, 44 from 1994 and 17 from 1995. Thus, I
selected a total of 250 opinion decisions.’56
Most of the information on opinion decisions was obtained from
the opinion itself and from the CCH Tax Court Petitions Digest. The
primari exception was the amount recovered by the IRS in split deci
sions,1 where the dollar amount was taken from the Tax Court file.
In addition, information about the notice of deficiency was obtained
from the file for some of these dockets.
The record in a case in which a stipulated decision was entered is
destroyed one year after the decision was entered, except for the deci
sion document stating the amount of the settlement and occasional
attachments.’58 Therefore, I targeted settled cases decided within the

1995.

There is a charge of $25 per box to see such files. This information was obtained by
telephone from Ruth Miles in the Public Files Office of the Tax Court.
The Tax Court and the IRS both publish aggregate statistics on the amount recovered
by the IRS in opinion decisions and stipulated decisions, but not on characteristics of individual
cases, which is necessary for a multivariate regression analysis. Therefore, it is not possible to
do a stud5y of this type on the aggregate data.
s accomplished this by using a random number generator to select a sample of cases
from a citation list printed from a Lexis search for all Tax Court cases decided in each of the
years 1990 through 1995 the years for which the files were kept by Public Files at the time I did
the stud.
A few additional opinion decisions arose out of the random docket number list dis
cussed below.
157
Under Tax Court Rule 155, the Tax Court asks the parties to submit a calculation, usu
ally because neither party won completely on all issues. See TAX CT. R. 155.
This information was obtained by telephone from Charles S. Casazza, Clerk of the Tax
Court.

346

CASE WESTERNRESERVEL4WREVIEW

[Vol. 49:3 15

one-year period preceding data collection.’59 However, I included
some settled cases that were older, although it was not possible to get
complete information on them from Tax Court files.
Settled cases were selected by using the CCH Tax Court Peti
tions Digest’s list of docket numbers from 1989 through 1994. These
years were selected as most likely to have resulted in a settlement
within the one-year period prior to data collection. Based on infor
mation that most cases settle in the month before trial and that most
trials in regular cases are scheduled approximately one year after the
petition is filed,’6° 1992 and 1993 were targeted as the years most
likely to have cases that settled in the relevant one-year period, so I
over-sampled from those years, taking 100 dockets from 1989, 80
dockets from 1990, 100 dockets from 1991, 150 dockets from 1992,
133 from 1993 and 70 from 1994. The goal was 250 stipulated deci
sions. I selected extra dockets because there was no way of knowing
in advance how many of the dockets would represent small tax cases,
cases that were still pending or other dockets we would need to ex
clude.’6’ The CCH Tax Court Docket Dispositions Digest was useful
in providing an indication of whether the docket had been disposed
of. I used the data on all random dockets possible, even if it actually
was an opinion decision. A few dockets were duplicative of decisions
already identified from the opinion list and were not included twice.
Where a docket number reflected a case that was still pending, I noted
that information. Using this method, I was able to obtain information
on 304 opinion decisions and 265 stipulated decisions.’62
After collecting the data, I eliminated cases from the sample that
were not deficiency cases,’63 had not been resolved at the time of data
collection or had been dismissed for lack ofjurisdiction.’64 This left a
total of 479 cases, of which 48% were opinions and 52% were set
tled.’65

159

Most of the data was collected in the summer of 1995.
See Tannenwald, supra note 53, at 826.
The statistician expected the usable cases from the docket list, for each of the years
1989-1994 to be 10, 20, 30, 60, 80 and 50, respectively.
162
attempted to follow up later with the Tax Court to obtain disposition information on
cases that had not yet been decided at the time of data collection but was I denied access to
additional Tax Court files because the Tax Court believes the files are meant for parties and
their attorneys, not researchers.
163
The Tax Court also has declaratory judgment jurisdiction over such matters as the taxexempt status of an entity. See I.R.C. § 7428 1997.
64
employed the conventional alpha of .05 the level of Type I error, i.e., false posi
tives. See infra note 173. The power, which is one minus the Type II error false negatives,
increases with the sample size. See FINIELSTEIN & LEVIN, supra note 52, at 186-87. I chose a
sample size of approximately 400 cases, in order to reduce the level of Type II error to 20%. I
decided to collect information on approximately 500 cases in case I had to eliminate more cases
than I originally
expected.
165
The initial list of cases included 569 cases. After eliminating those docket numbers
that corresponded to small tax cases which were not available to the public, non-deficiency
cases and those that had not yet been decided, 479 remained. See Appendix D for statistics on
the 479 cases.
161

1999]

WHICH CASES GO TO TRIAL?

347

In the set of 479 cases that remained after unusable cases were
eliminated, there were 84 decisions from 1990, 41 of which were
opinions; 70 from 1991, 41 ofwhich were opinions; 86 from 1992, 48
of which were opinions; 101 from 1993, 39 of which were opinions;
107 from 1994, 41 of which were opinions; and 31 from 1995, 20 of
which were opinions.
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Appendix B: The Multiple Regression Procedure
In order to isolate the effect of each of the nine "independent
variables" STAKES, APPEALS, JUDGETYPE, DECADE, BACK
GROUND, PARTY, TAXPAYER, REGION and COUNSEL, on the
dependent variable, settlement or trial outcome TRIAL, I used a
multivariate logit or "logistic"’66 regression analysis.’67 Multivari
ate regression permits examination of the separate effect’ of each of
the independent variables on the dependent variable, while controlling
for all of the other independent variables.’69 This enabled me to both
test the hypothesis that tried cases differ from settled ones, in observ
able ways, and to isolate some of the characteristics that are the pre
dictors of cases that will go to trial.’70
Multiple regression requires eliminating any case that does not
contain information on all of the independent variables used in a par
ticular run.171 As a result, because of gaps in information on some of
166
Logistic regression was used because where the dependent variable has a dichotomous
outcome here, trial or settlement, ordinary least squares regression can not be used because the
assumption that the errors are homoskedastic is violated. See F[NKELSTEIN & LEVtN, supra note
51, at 448; Deborah Jones Merritt & Barbara F. Reskin, Sex, Race, and Credentials: The Truth
AboutA6q’lrmative Action in Law Faculty Hiring, 97 C0LUM. L. REv. 199,238 n.123 1997.
Most of the statistical analyses were done with the LR program of BMDP software. A
few runs were done using SPSS. For coding purposes, the dependent variable TRIAL was
coded with opinion as "success" and settlement as "failure." See Appendix C for the equation
used.
66 See Merritt & Reskin, supra note 166, at 239 n.125. "Regression analyses detect only
relationships between independent and dependent variables; they cannot prove causal connec
tions between those variables. However, when an independent variable precedes a dependent
variable in time, when independent variables are chosen for their theoretical link to the depend
ent variable, and when the analysis controls for possibly confounding factors, it is reasonable to
infer that independent variables with significant partial coefficients causally influenced the
dependent variable.".
See, e.g., Hall et al., supra note 49, at 1066 "Multiple regression is a statistical tech
nique that determines the effect of a single factor on a designated outcome, holding all other
factors constant. Therefore, it is capable of separating out the commingled effects of many
factors."; Deborah J. Merritt et al., Family, Place, and Career: The Gender Paradox in Law
School Hiring, 1993 Wis. L. REv. 395, 422 "Multiple regression is an analytic technique that
estimates the independent or ‘partial’ effect of each of several independent variables. . . on a
dependent variable
.
170
It is of course possible that there are other predictors of cases that will be selected for
trial. However, that possibility does not undermine the statistical significance of the data used
in this study. Instead, all multiple regression equations use an "error term," which is a constant,
to account for the possibility that other independent variables are predictors of the dependent
variable.
171
The data can be envisioned as a matrix with case numbers listed down the left side and
independent variables listed across the top. If a particular case does not have information on a
particular variable, there is an empty cell. Because the computer requires all cells to have data,
either an empty cell must be filled with an approximation based on the predictions from the
other data, the case must be removed, or the variable must be removed from the analysis. Fill
ing in the cell merely serves to artificially increase statistical significance by artificially in
creasing sample size; the prediction for the value in the missing cell is based on the predictions
of the other cases for which there is data. Thus, it is better to eliminate the case from the run or
to eliminate that variable in some runs.
Because approximately 25% of the cases were missing information on the APPEALS
variable, and because of its importance in the analyses, I did several runs on both the main
group of cases and the subset of 342 cases containing information on the APPEALS variable, in
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my cases, particularly settled cases, I was not able to do regressions
on the full set of cases; I used a subset of 342 cases for some of the
analyses.’72 The results of the regressions on the subset of 342 cases
were very consistent with the regressions on larger groups of cases,
reinforcing those results obtained from the smaller runs.
A multiple regression run indicates the "statistical significance"
of each independent variable in predicting the dependent variable.’73
Each of these variables was a categorical variable with one reference
group and one or more additional groups.174 For example, the
STAKES variable was divided into four groups, so that each case was
put into one of the four groups, depending on the dollar amount at
stake in the case. Logistic regression provides the "log odds" for each
variable. Log odds is the number of times by which an outcome
here, opinion decision is more likely in a particular group, compared
order to see if the data sets were different in some other way that would skew the results ob
mined in runs with the smaller group of cases. My results were generally consistent, see Ap
pendix E, although, as discussed below, there were differences between the 342 cases and the
137 cases that were not included in the runs of the 342 cases. Settled cases were disproportion
ately missing the APPEALS variable. See Appendix E. Unfortunately, the Tax Court’s policy
of destroying most of the file in settled cases one year after entry of decision limited my ability
to fill in missing APPEALS information in those cases.
172
The 342 cases were not completely representative of the 479 cases. Individual com
parisons by variable of what percent of the cases in each group, the 342 cases and the 137 cases
that were excluded from the smaller runs, fell into the categories for that variable, revealed
compositional differences in each variable. This is not surprising because the smaller set was
not randomly selected but rather reflected those cases that had complete information. Most of
the missing information was missing disproportionately from settled cases, as explained above.
See supra note 171. Of the 342 cases, 58.5% were opinion decisions and 41.5% were settled.
That should be contrasted with the cases that were removed the 137 cases, of which only
21.9% were opinion decisions. Decisions that were removed were most often missing AP
PEALS information, but were sometimes missing STAKES data. Less often, the case was
missing data on another variable, such as REGION, which, for settled decisions, was only avail
able from the taxpayer’s petition, and thus not available after the file was destroyed. I was able
to fill in some gaps in information in cases where the taxpayer had counsel from the CCH Tax
Court Petitions Digest. The CCH Tax Court Petitions Digest does not have specific information
for cases in which the taxpayer was pro se.
Because the group of 342 cases is not representative of the full set of cases, results from
runs on that subset must be viewed with caution. However, because they were generally con
sistent with runs on larger sets of cases, see Appendix E, they were helpful in seeing the effect
of the APPEALS variable, which could only be included as a variable in the larger runs. At the
optimum cut point, runs on the 342 cases predicted 70% to 75% of the cases correctly, with
results skewed toward correctly predicting opinion decisions.
‘°
See Gross & Syverud, Getting to No, supra note 12, at 334 n.48. "Statistical signifi
cance-commonly denoted by ‘p-values’-is a measure of the probability that a deviation from
an expected pattern of events as extreme as that observed, or more extreme, would have oc
curred if the process that produced the observed pattern were mere chance. Thus a p-value of
.01 or a statement that a difference is ‘significant at the .01 level’ signifies that the observed
deviation from the expected pattern, or a more extreme one, would have occurred by chance no
more often than one time in one hundred. By a venerable but arbitrary scientific convention,
findings are said to be ‘statistically significant’ if they could have occurred by chance one time
in twenty or less often-that is, if they have a p-value of .05 or smaller. Note that the smaller
the p-value the greater the confidence that the results do not reflect mere chance fluctuations."
The p-values reported in Appendices E and F reflect the statistical significance of each
independent variable as a whole. That is, for a variable such as STAKES, the p-value reflects
the joint values of the F test for each of the STAKES dummy variables.
"
See Appendix D for a list and explanation of the variables. A "categorical" variable is
one that is divided into categories such as represented or pro se rather than "continuous" which
reflects a range of values such as dollars. See Appendix D for information about how many
cases had values in each group of each independent variable.
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to the reference group, controlling for the effect of the other inde
pendent variables.’75 The confidence interval for the log odds ratio
gives a range within which there is 95% confidence level that the true
log odds fall.’76
One objective in a regression analysis is to select the fewest independent variables that are the most predictive of the dependent
variable, here TRIAL trial or settlement outcome.’77 "Stepwise"
regressions were used as a tool to select the strongest subset of the
nine variables. In a stepwise regression, at each step in the process,
the computer program ranks the variables in order of significance,
removes the least significant variable, and runs the analysis again,
with the objective of retaining only the statistically significant inde
pendent variables in the regression equation.’78 For my strongest
model,’79 I chose the variables to include based not only on the stepwise regressions but also on other runs on various groups of variables.

‘

For example, for STAKES, the regression provides a log odds ratio that provides how
many times more likely a case is to go to trial in the particular group such as cases with stakes
of more than $500,000 compared to the reference group of zero to $10,000.
APPEALS was grouped into cases that went to the Appeals Office prior to docketing and
those that did not, with those that did as the reference group. The STAKES variable was
grouped into four categories, zero to $10,000; $10,001 to $100,000; $100,001 to $500,000; and
over $500,000; with zero to $10,000 as the reference group. For JUDGETYPE, judge as op
posed to Special Trial Judge was the reference group. DECADE was grouped into judicial
appointments in the 1960s to 1970s the reference group, 1980s, and 1990s. BACKGROUND
had three categories, the reference group of "private," where the judge or Special Trial Judge’s
background was in the private sector, government or both. For PARTY, Republican was the
reference group. For COUNSEL, pro se was the reference group. REGION, the area of the
country in which the taxpayer resided at the time he petitioned the Tax Court, was grouped into
the seven IRS regions that existed prior to 1996, with the Central region as the reference group.
TAXPAYER used individuals as the reference group, corporations as another group and "other"
as the fmal group. See Appendix E.
176
In other words, if the log odds for a particular group is 2.30, then cases with that fea
ture are 2.30 times more likely to go to trial and opinion than cases in the reference group cases
without that feature. If the confidence interval is 1.83 to 4.22, then the "true" log odds has a
95% likelihood of falling between those two numbers. If the confidence interval includes 1,
then it is possible that the particular group is equally likely as the reference group to go to trial
and opinion, which means that the relationship observed for that particular group could have
occurred by chance.
See FtNKELSTEtN & LEVIN, supra note 52, at 356-57 "In general, then, the objective
in a regression model is to achieve ‘parsimony’ by including the fewest factors that explain the
most variation in the dependent variable with the greatest degree of statistical significance for
each factor.".
178
See id. explaining process of stepwise regression.
1See Appendix E, Model 5.
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Appendix C.’ Equation and Variables
To determine if particular case features predict an increase like
lihood of trial, the estimated equation’8° is:
logTRIAL/l -TRIAL = constant ÷
b*STAKES + c*JUDGETYPE +
e*I3ACKGROUND + f*PARTY +
h*REGION + i*T&JPAYER

a*APPEALS
d*DECADE

+
+

g*coUNsEL

+

The variables used in the equation are as follows:
Dependent Variable
TRIAL is a dummy variable equal to 1 for a tried case opinion
decision and 0 for a settled case stipulated decision.
Independent Variables
APPEALS is a dummy variable reflecting whether the case went
though the IRS appeals process prior to Tax Court docketing. The
reference group is cases that went through the pre-docketing process.
STAKES is the size of the dollar amount at stake in the case. It is
categorical, with cutpoints at $10,000; $100,000; $500,000; and
$1,000,000. $0 to $10,000 is the reference group.
JUDGETYPE is a dummy variable for the kind of judge as
signed to the case, regular judge or Special Trial Judge. The refer
ence group is regular judge.
DECADE is a categorical variable for the decade in which the
judge in the case was appointed to the bench. The reference group is
1960s to 1970s. The other two groups are 1980s and 1990s.
BACKGROUND is a categorical variable for the judge’s back
ground prior to appointment to the bench. Private sector is the refer
ence group, and the other two groups are 1 government and 2 both
private sector and government experience.
PARTY is a dummy variable for the political party of the Presi
dent that appointed the judge, or in the case of Special Trial Judges,
the President who appointed the Chief Judge who appointed the Spe
180 The
equation differs depending on the model in that, as shown in Appendix E, not all
independent variables are included in all runs, so the equation must be modified to drop any
variable not included in that run.
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cia! Trial Judge. Republican is the reference group, and Democrat is
the other group.
COUNSEL is a dummy variable for whether or not the taxpayer
was represented in the Tax Court. Pro se is the reference group.
REGION is a categorical variable for the region in which the
taxpayer resided at the time he invoked the Tax Court=s jurisdiction.
There are seven groups in REGION, corresponding to the seven IRS
regions that existed at the time the cases in the sample were decided
by the Tax Court. Central is the reference group. The other regions
are Midatlantic, Midwest, Northat!antic, Southeast, Southwest, and
West.
TAXPAYER is a categorical variable for the type of taxpayer in
the case. Corporation is the reference group. The other two groups
are 1 individual and 2 other.
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Appendix D: The Variables-Descriptive Statistics
n=

479181

TRIAL’82 n=479: 230 48.02% opinion, 249 5 1.98% settled
APPEALS n=355: 31.38% appeals; 68.62% not appeals. Of
opinion cases, 43.56% are appeals and 56.44% are not appeals; of
settled cases, 16.34% are appeals and 83.66% are not appeals.
STAKES n=391: 22.25% are $0-$ 10,000; 45.78% are $10,000$100,000; 17.39% are $100,000-$500,000; 4.86% are $500,00-$1
million; and 9.72% are over $1 million. Of opinion cases, 20.35% are
$0-$10,000; 39.82% are $10,000-$100,000; 19.91% are $100,000$500,000; 7.08% are $500,000-$i million; and 12.83% are over $1
million. Of settled cases, 24.85% are $0-$10,000; 53.94% are
$10,000-$100,000; 13.94% are $l00,000-$500,000; 1.82% are
$500,000-$1 million; and 5.45% are over $1 million.
JUDGETYPE n=479: 78.71% judges; 21.29% Special Trial
Judges. Of opinion cases, 75.65% are judges and 24.35% are Special
Trial Judges. Of settled cases, 81.53% are judges and 18.47% are
Special Trial Judges.
DECADE n=479: 29.65% 1960s-1970s; 61.17% 1980s; 9.19%
1990s. Of opinion cases, 29.13% are 1960s-1970s; 58.26% are
1980s; 12.61% are 1990s. Of settled cases, 30.12% are 1960s-1970s;
61.17% are 1980s; 9.19% are 1990s.
BACKGROUND n=479: 14.61% have private sector experi
ence; 25.68% have a government background; 59.7 1% have both. Of
opinion decisions, 16.52% have private sector experience, 37.39%
have a government background; 46.09% both. Of settled decisions,
12.85% have private sector experience, 14.86% have a government
background; 72.29% have both.

181

The full set of cases is 479 cases. However, because there is not complete information
on each independent variable, I have noted the sample n size next to each variable.
182 TRIAL is
the dependent variable.
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PARTY n=479: 62.42% Republican; 37.58% Democrat. Of
opinion cases, 6 1.74% Republican; 38.26% Democrat. Of settled
cases, 63.05% Republican; 36.95% Democrat.
COUNSEL n=428: 32.24% are pro Se; 67.76% are represented.
Of opinion decisions, 32.17% are pro Se; 67.83% are represented. Of
settled decisions, 32.32% are pro Se; 67.78% are represented.
REGION n=413: 10.65% Central; 7.02% Midatlantic; 9.44%
Midwest; 9.93% Northatlantic; 14.04% Southeast; 19.85% South
weSt; 29.06% West. Of opinion decisions, 13.06% Central; 8.56%
Midatlantic; 9.01% Midwest; 8.56% Northatlantic; 13.96% Southeast;
20.27% Southwest; 26.58% West. Of Settled decisions, 7.85% Cen
tral; 5.24% Midatlantic; 9.95% Midwest; 11.52% Northatlantic;
14. 14% Southeast; 19.37% Southwest; 3 1.94% West.
TAXPAYER n=475: 10.74% corporations; 84.0% individuals;
5.26% other. Of opinion cases, 12.72% are corporations; 82.02% are
individuals; 5.26% are other. Of settled cases, 8.91% are corpora
tions; 85.83% are individuals; 5.26% are other.
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Appendix D continued: The Variables
n=342183
TRIAL: 200 58.5% opinion, 142 41.5% settled
APPEALS: 32.2% appeals; 67.8% not appeals. Of opinion
cases, 43.5% are appeals and 56.5% are not appeals; of settled cases,
16.2% are appeals and 83.8% are not appeals.
STAKES: 22.5% are $0-$10,000; 43.9% are $10,000-$100,000;
18.1% are $lOO,000-$500,000; and 15.5% are over $500,000. Of
opinion cases, 21.5% are $0-$10,000; 36.5% are $10,000-$100,000;
20.5% are $lOO,000-$500,000; and 21.5% are over $500,000. Of
settled cases, 23.9% are $0-$10,000; 54.2% are $10,000-$100,000;
14.8% are $100,000-$500,000; and 7.0% are over $500,000.
JIJDGETYPE: 81.3% judges; 18.7% Special Trial Judges. Of
opinion cases, 76.5% are judges and 23.5% are Special Trial Judges.
Of settled cases, 88.0% are judges and 12.0% are Special Trial
Judges.
DECADE: 23.4% 1960s-1970s; 66.7% 1980s; 9.9% 1990s. Of
opinion cases, 30.5% are 1960s-1970s; 58.5% are 1980s; 11.0% are
1990s. Of settled cases, 13.4% are 1960s-1970s; 78.2% are 1980s;
8.5% are 1990s.
BACKGROUND: 16.1% private; 28.4% government; 55.6%
both. Of opinion decisions, 17.0% have private sector experience,
35.5% have a government background; 47.5% have both. Of settled
decisions, 14.8% have private Sector experience, 18.3% have a gov
ernment background; 66.9% have both.
PARTY: 70.5% Republican; 29.5% Democrat. Of opinion
cases, 61.5% Republican; 38.5% Democrat. Of settled cases, 83.1%
Republican; 16.9% Democrat.

183
This set of 342 cases is a subset that was used for many runs because it enabled inclu
sion of the key independent variables. REGION and TAXPAYER were not included in runs on
the set of 342 cases because they were not statistically significant in any run.

356

CASE WESTERNRESERVELAWREVIEW

[Vol. 49:315

COUNSEL: 33.9% pro se; 66.1% represented. Of opinion deci
sions, 27.0% pro Se; 73.0% represented. Of settled decisions, 43.7%
pro se; 56.3% represented.
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Appendix E:
Logistic Regression Results for TRIAL: p-values for each Variable and ExpCoeJ with Parenthetical
95% Confidence Interval for each Group with Respect to the Reference Group for that Variable184

Model I

Model 2

Modol. 3

Model 4

Mpdet5

n387

n=387

n=342

n=346

p=.OOK

p=.BYJO

.260146, .463

.241.137, 4.26

VARIABLE reference group
APPEALS: Pre.docketing IRS appeal
No pre-docketing IRS appeal
STAKES:$O-$IO,000

p.0003

p..0009

p,0009

p=.OOS7

p=.000S

$lO,00I-$l00,000

1.82914. 3.62

1.61828, 3.14

1.71871, 3,37

1.67763, 3.66

1.67780. 3.59

$100,00l-$500,000

4.511.85. 11.0

3.1811.33, 6.81

3.221.40, 7,37

2.50980. 6.35

2.811.14, 6.92

$Ovec $500,000

9.283.33, 25.9

5.952.38, 14.9

6.302.49. 15.9

6.292.19, 18,0

7.122.59, 19.6

p=.0321

p=.01833

p’.O268

p=.0719

p=.OOI6

2.771.15, 6.65

3.991.94, 8.21

2.671.16, 6.17

2.47942, 6.49

3.811.68,8.60

p=.4313

p=.O586

p.l&38

p.O077

1980s

.775372. 1.61

.532300, .943

.539232, 1.16

.364189.700

1990s

1.28445, 3.66

.906360,2.28

.884278, 2.81

.629220, 1.80

JUDGEI’YPE: Regularjudge
Special Trial Judge
DECADE: 1960s-1970s

BACKGROUND: Private sector

p=.OO78

p..0027

p’.OOl6

p=.0390

p=.043l

Government

3.72738,3.99

1.77794, 3.94

1.84826, 4.11

1.17474, 2.88

1.21493. 2.95

Both

.643311, 1.33

.663337, 1,31

.638324, 1.26

.556259. 1.19

.583273, 1.24

p=.t 99

p’.O993

p.1349

1.93885, 4.21

1.94910,4.14

1.93829, 4.51

PARTY: Republican
Democrat
COUNSEL: Prose

p=.4946

Represented

.21720, 2.04

REGION: Central

p=.6299
1.13697, 1.84

p=.7385
.09667, 1.78

p.4088
1.27728. 2.22

p=.6468

Midatlantic

.841272. 2.60

Midwest

.437157, 1.22

Northattantic

.409149, 1.13

Southeast

.492193, 1.26

Southwest

.648275, 3.53

West

.597263, 1.37

TAXPAYER: Corpomtion
Individual

p=.0932
.41643, 3.10

Other

.405126, 1.30

84

The reference group for each variable appears in italics next to the name of the

variable.
85
n is the number of cases included in the particular run. The number varies because
the computer can not include any case missing a value for any variable included in that run.
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Appendix F:
Logistic Regression Results for TRIAL:
Comparison of Runs on STAKES, JUDGETYPE, DECADE, BACKGROUND, PARTY and
COUNSEL, with and without Interaction Term for DECADE and PARTY
p-value for each variable, ExpCoef for each group, and, in parenthesis,
95% confidence interval for each ExpCoet
Without Interaction Term

With Interaction Term

n=387

n=387

STAKES: $O$IO,OOO186

p=.0009

p=.0008

$10,00l-$l00,000

l.71.871, 3.37

l.70.861, 3.36

$l00,00l-$500,000

3.221.40, 7.37

3.231.40,7.42

Over $500,000

6.302.49, 15.9

6.382.51, 16.2

JUDGETYPE: Regularjudge

p=.0268

p=. 1578

Special Trial Judge

2.671.16, 6.17

2.05.783, 5.39

DECADE: 1960s-1970s

p=.3324

VARIABLE: reference group

187

1980s

.789.387, 1.61

.550.199, 1.52

1990s

1 .39.497, 3.88

1 .07.309, 3.68

BACKGROUND: Private sector

p=.O0l6

p=.0O36

Government

1.84.826, 4.11

1.78793, 3.98

Both

.638.324, 1.26

.652.330, 1.29

PARTY: Republican

pm.0993

188

Democrat

1 .94.910, 4.14

1.31 .436, 3.92

COUNSEL: Prose

p=.7385

p=.Tllfl

Represented

l.09.667, 1.78

l.08.658, 1.77

variable.

86

The reference group for each variable appears in italics next to the name of the

97

Thep value is absent here because I used DECADE
See supra note 187.

188

*

PARTY in this run.

